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ABSTRACT 
In an environment with valuable information assets, the threat of subversion is 
real.  Thus, systems must be built from the ground up to counter the level of 
sophistication and capital that is pitted against them.  To build such systems, rigorous 
assurance criteria must be met.   
Currently for high assurance systems there is no publicly available example of 
their design and construction.  The Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) Project is 
intended to make publicly available a high assurance component and its evaluation 
evidence.  This work is to build a working prototype of selected TCX kernel 
functionality.  
The prototype is constructed and based on OSKit, and restricts information flow 
between memory partitions and resource accesses made by processes.  Pages are 
statically allocated on a per-partition basis and page faults are handled by the kernel.  
The prototype demonstrates a least privilege-based approach to exported resource 
management.  It uses a separation kernel with preloaded configuration data to allocate 
memory resources to processes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MOTIVATION 
Finding the right balance between protecting data from those who should not have 
access and enabling data sharing with those who have a need to know is a difficult 
problem.  This problem is a real concern for those responsible over protecting classified 
data.  To help those responsible, the Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP) [1] can motivate 
approach to system design that results in the protection of data while still permitting 
access to those with the access need.  This approach is beneficial for building high 
assurance systems that protect sensitive data.   
One problem with high assurance systems is that there is no publicly available 
example of their design and construction.  This does not enable reuse of key concepts 
associated with the design and construction of high assurance systems, which would 
benefit future projects in the domain space for both research and commercial use. 
The motivation for this thesis is to provide a prototype of certain separation kernel 
functionality for the TCX Project, which has the goal of providing a high assurance 
kernel that adheres to the PoLP and makes publicly available its evaluation evidence.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of the work done and explained in this paper is to prototype certain 
functions for a Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) as part of the TCX Project.  
This thesis focuses on memory separation that adheres to the PoLP [2]-[4]. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The organization of this work is as follows: 
• Chapter I discusses the motivation and purpose of this thesis. 
• Chapter II discusses the background information for understanding the 
thesis work. 
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• Chapter III discusses the operating system development kits that were 
surveyed and chosen for use in the LPSK prototype. 
• Chapter IV discusses the implementation of the LPSK prototype. 
• Chapter V discusses the procedures used in testing the LPSK prototype 
and their results. 
• Chapter VI concludes with a discussion of the benefits gained from the 
approach taken and future work still needed to be done. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides background on a range of topics associated with the 
prototype implementation of a least privilege separation kernel interface.  To fully 
understand this work one must be familiar with the topics of subversion, the TCX project, 
open source configurable operating systems, separation kernels, and the Least Privilege 
Separation Kernel (LPSK).   
A. SUBVERSION 
When other forms of attack against a system are not possible, sophisticated, well 
funded attackers employ subversion.  Even though subversion is time consuming, these 
attackers are sufficiently focused to mount such long range attacks.  To better understand 
the aspects of subversion, this section will define subversion, describe subversion’s 
purpose and who uses it, explain how subversion is implemented, deployed and triggered, 
outline what we can do to prevent subversion with its affiliated mitigation costs, and 
reiterate why subversion prevention is important. 
1. Definition of Subversion 
System Subversion as defined by Myers is ‘… the covert and methodical 
undermining of internal and external controls over a system lifetime to allow 
unauthorized or undetected access to system resources and/or information.’  Covertly 
compromising a system through subversion permits the use of surreptitious methods to 
allow undetectable unauthorized access to a system’s data or controls [5].    
2. Purpose of Subversion 
The general purpose of subversion is to covertly gain privileged access to the 
target system in order to exploit or threaten to exploit it at the most opportune time.  
Subversion is the attack of choice by the professional attacker [6]. 
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3. Implementation of Subversion 
Implementing subversion is tricky, but can be done by one or more compromised 
insiders and through the use of special mechanisms.  Compromising insiders or getting 
compromised individuals and/or mechanisms inside a government and/or civilian facility 
is a method that sophisticated adversaries will exploit when necessary.  To deploy 
subversion, a mechanism or insider must get a back door inside a system that is hidden 
from detection until used.  This may be done through the use of malware or rootkitting a 
system during any of the stages of the life cycle of the system.  A trigger for a backdoor 
might be as simple as receipt of a single UDP packet over the Internet by a system 
machine that has been subverted [7].  The ability of an insider to deploy such subversion 
mechanisms makes the insider a great potential threat. 
4. Subversion Vulnerability Pertinence 
Experiments in system subversion have demonstrated that any medium level 
programmer has the capability to subvert a system, and it did not take very many lines of 
code to subvert a system [7]-[10].   
5. Protection against Subversion 
To mitigate the threat of system subversion, certain guarantees in a system’s 
security functional requirements and security assurance requirements must be established.  
An international standard known as the Common Criteria has been established as a means 
to guarantee that functional and assurance requirements are met to the level as promised.  
The Common Criteria has an assurance ranking system ranging from EAL1 to EAL7 
[11].  EAL7 is similar to Class A1 from the Trusted Computer System Evaluation 
Criteria [12], an older standard.  To obtain a high EAL ranking, the system must go 
through costly and time consuming methodical processes, but considering the harm 
unauthorized access to information could cause, these extra measures are worth it.  The 
Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) project is developing an EAL 7 system that will be 
openly available [2].  
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6. Cost of Mitigation 
The use of a highly rigorous development methodology, as required at EAL7, is a 
way to protect a system from subversion.  Protecting DoD facilities this way from 
subversion is quite expensive.  System subversion can be mitigated by methodically 
verifying every aspect of the system through formal methods and other procedures.  
Unfortunately, this method only works on small systems since “[t]he size and complexity 
of today’s typical large system prohibit attempts to demonstrate that the entire system is 
verifiable” [6].   
7. Subversion Summary 
Subversion was defined via Myers’ system subversion definition.  Subversion’s 
purpose and the people involved are discussed to better understand the threat.  
Subversion’s implementation, deployment and triggering mechanisms were briefly 
discussed.  The lack of readily available development frameworks to build high assurance 
systems has kept development costs high.  To combat these costly endeavors, NPS is 
developing the TCX project, one objective of which is to reduce the time necessary to 
generate high assurance systems.  
B. TCX PROJECT 
1. TCX Approach 
The objective of the Trusted Computing Base (TCX) project is to make readily 
available source code and documentation that will help others build more complex high 
assurance systems [2].  The project is building an open source high assurance 
development framework, least-privilege separation kernel, and model application.  The 
intent for the final kernel is to bring the system to an initial secure state and to ensure that 
every possible subsequent state is secure.    
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2. Implementation of TCX Approach  
The implementation of the TCX project involves many stages.  The first stage 
consists of defining a high assurance development framework.  The second stage 
involves using the framework to build a trusted computing component based on the 
reference monitor concept [13]: the Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK).  The third 
stage will be a third party evaluation of the LPSK.  Finally, the results from the project 
will be made available.  Source code, as well as, the documentation will be made 
available as open source [2].  The work presented here consists of building and testing a 
prototype that exhibits a subset of the interface functionality of the least privilege 
separation kernel. 
C. OPEN SOURCE CONFIGURABLE OPERATING SYSTEMS 
To enable the building of the prototype, a configurable operating system is used.  
An open source configurable operating system is an open source development 
environment that can be used to create, alter, and/or update kernels and their internal 
mechanisms.   This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of open source 
software and provides a list of supported features for configurable operating systems. 
1. Open Source Development Advantages 
Keeping a project open source has many advantages.  Open source projects allow 
a larger amount of scrutiny among peers through openness of viewing source code and 
procedure documents.  Keeping a project open source allows other groups to extend the 
research undertaken and add input.  In addition, open source projects, relative to 
proprietary projects, often do not need as many resources expended to sell good ideas.   
2. Open Source Development Disadvantages 
However, open source projects also have disadvantages.  Open source projects 
may have very little funding.  Some open source companies such as Red Hat Inc. have 
been able to fund such projects by charging fees for technical support.  Another problem 
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is many open source development kits have been abandoned or have had limited recent 
contributions, making it difficult to run the latest hardware and/or software.   
3. Supported Features of Configurable Operating Systems 
A configurable operating system may have many features, depending on its 
intended use.  Certain features are advantageous for use in developing the prototype.  
These features include: platform support, hardware multi-ring support, memory isolation, 
ease of use for compilation (i.e., configure, make, and make install), I/O support, 
debugging support, simple design, kernel system calls, and memory management. 
D. SEPARATION KERNEL 
A separation kernel is a kernel that allocates resources, blocks or partitions, and 
mediates flow between blocks.  Its mechanisms run in the most privileged domain of the 
system.  A separation kernel has both advantages and disadvantages over the traditional 
security kernel approach.  These advantages and disadvantages will be introduced along 
with the Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) approach which is slightly different 
than the typical separation kernel approach. 
1. Separation Kernel Advantages 
The separation kernel approach simplifies the information flow checking 
mechanisms of the kernel base by preventing direct interaction between processes that 
have been separated.  The separation kernel approach works by partitioning system 
resources.  This approach also allows the separation kernel to be very simple, for 
evaluation, and moves non-security relevant processing out of the separation kernel. 
2. Separation Kernel Disadvantages 
Policies such as those captured by the Bell-LaPadula [14] model are not part of 
the separation kernel definition or implementation.  Thus when a separation kernel is 
used to enforce a Multi-Level Security (MLS) policy, extraordinary care must be taken to 
define the kernel configuration data. 
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3. Principle of Least Privilege approach  
The principle of least privilege approach limits information flow between 
partitions to only the flow required to achieve the desired functionality of the system as a 
whole. 
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III. KERNEL KIT SELECTION 
This chapter describes the selection process for choosing the kernel kit that was 
used for the building of the prototype.  The eventual choice was OSKit.  To understand 
the reason for this choice, one must review the requirements used in the kernel kit 
selection.  A kernel kit provides the ability to customize and extend the features and 
capabilities of the kernel. 
A. KERNEL KIT REQUIREMENTS 
To enable the development of the kernel prototype, a kernel kit has to be chosen.  
A sample of kernel kits was taken based on two requirements: the operating system could 
not be too large and complex and it had to be written in the C/C++ language and/or 
assembly.  The sample set of candidate kernel kits was not intended to be comprehensive 
but merely to include the most predominant small scale operating systems that appeared 
to provide kernel development capabilities.  After the sample set was identified, the 
various operating systems were reviewed against requirements to determine the best 
choice for the needs of the prototype.  The requirements were subdivided into two key 
requirement divisions: mandatory requirements and suggested requirements.  If any 
mandatory requirement was not met, the operating system was removed from further 
consideration. 
1. Mandatory Requirements 
The chosen mandatory requirements were based on the following factors: cost, 
availability, and pertinence for the prototype.  In addition, it must run on an x86 platform, 
provide a stable release, have available source code that can be altered, and have more 
than one privilege domain. 
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a. x86 Platform 
The requirement to execute on an x86 platform is mandatory because of 
the necessary features it provides.  These are: segmentation, privilege levels, hardware 
tasks, and call gates. 
(1)  Segmentation.  Segmentation is implemented in the x86 
architectures and supports highly granular management for the address space of each 
process.  Segmentation can support process isolation and controlled sharing of objects 
among processes. 
(2)  Privilege Levels.  An x86 platform supports four hardware 
privilege levels: 0 to 3, with 0 being the most privileged.  Privilege levels permit the most 
privileged domain, i.e., that of the kernel, to be protected from applications.  Privilege 
levels are totally ordered and permit tasks to be organized in ways that support least 
privilege. 
(3)  Task State Segments (TSS).  In multitasking environments 
where tasks must concurrently run, a task's running state must be saved.  A task’s running 
state is stored in its task state segment.  The other benefit of the use of a TSS is code 
efficiency.  The context switch can happen with only one instruction.  This allows context 
switching to be performed easily. 
(4)  Call Gates and Traps.  When tasks are running in a less 
privileged domain and must access resources available in a more privileged domain, 
execution goes through a call gate.  Hardware privilege checks ensure that services are 
provided to the caller while ensuring the integrity of the other privilege domains within 
the task. 
b. Stable Release 
Providing a stable release of the system from which the prototype will be 
built is a mandatory requirement.  A stable release means that the kernel kit has been 
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thoroughly debugged and tested.  Spending too much time trying to track down software 
bugs in the prototype is not a luxury the constricted development timeframe provides. 
c. Open Source Code Environment 
An open source code and environment requirement is mandatory because 
of the benefits of modification, simple acquisition, and cost. 
 (1)  Modification.  Due to the nature of the prototype being built, 
the kernel kit must be modifiable.  No other known and available open source prototype 
exists for a system implementing the strong memory partitioning with fixed task 
scheduling intended in this project.  This project will take advantage of existing drivers 
for network and I/O controls and basic operating system operations such as message 
passing and threading.  In building the prototype, software reuse with modifications as 
needed makes the most sense.  Due to these reasons, the requirement of being able to 
modify the source code is mandatory.   
 (2)  Simple Acquisition.  In order to modify the code, one must be 
able to acquire the code in an easy acquisition process.  Understanding how to download, 
install, and run the software should not be difficult.  The problems that prevent simple 
acquisition include proprietary code, lack of documentation, and lack of archiving 
support.  Some Open Source Standards take care of these problems through GNU 
licensing agreements by following the three step Unix installation standard (i.e., 
configure, make, and make install), and by having online archives of source code.  Use of 
the Unix compilation standard helps with any lack of documentation for installation.  An 
online archive of source code helps provide the ability to download the source code in an 
easy manner.   
 (3)  Virtually No Cost.  Purchasing expensive software for the 
prototype is not an option.  The benefit of open source software is that it can be acquired 
at minimal or no cost.   
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d. More Than one Privilege Domain Environment 
To provide the ability of the prototype to partition memory and securely 
control information flow, a kernel that implements user and kernel tasks is mandatory.  
The requirements for having more than one privilege domain is achieved through 
hardware support for privilege domains, and code support running in the most privileged 
domain. 
 (1)  Hardware Requirement.  The hardware requirement to enforce 
separation of privilege domains is provided by the x86 platform.  In x86 platforms, the 
CPU checks memory accesses and permissions and traps when a task tries to access 
memory not permitted. 
 (2)  Code Support.  When the hardware interrupts due to non-
privileged attempts to access privileged instructions, the software must properly handle 
these faults.  As part of the mandatory requirement to use more than one privilege 
domain, it is required that trap-handling mechanisms be built in and easy to modify. 
2. Suggested Requirements 
The suggested requirements for the system are as follows: simple code generation 
support, actively maintained software, and debugging support.  It is not assumed that any 
one kernel kit will meet every mandatory and suggested requirement; however, the 
suggested requirements help narrow the search for the best kernel kit.  
a. Simple Code Generation Support 
A suggested requirement is set of simple mechanisms to build the kernel.  
These may include make files and other tools. 
 (1)  Make-File Like Procedures.  Due to the complexity of 
operating systems, compiling and linking in all of the include files and resources can be a 
daunting task.  To remember and type in by hand all of the necessary inputs for the 
prototype to be built is difficult at best. 
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Choosing kernel kits that provide a make file mechanism solves 
this problem.  The make file may require some modifications for the prototype. 
 (2)  Quick Compile Times.  A disadvantage of building binaries 
for an operating system is the time it takes to compile them.  This can slow development 
time. 
To resolve this development time problem, it is important the 
targeted kernel kit be comprised of a set of binaries that can be linked together.  This 
separation speeds up compilation when large chunks of code do not need to be 
recompiled but simply linked in.  Having make files that only recompile the changed files 
is helpful at speeding up development time and thus is a part of the suggested 
requirement for simple code generation support. 
b. Actively Maintained 
Another suggested requirement is that the chosen kernel kit is actively 
maintained.  To be deemed actively maintained, the website that provides the location to 
acquire the source code must be recently updated by the webmaster, providing recent 
stable releases of the source code, and encouraging feedback for new releases. 
 (1)  Website Maintained.  To determine whether a kernel kit is 
actively maintained, a check is made to see if the hosting website is active.  The software 
must be supported by an active community for active maintenance.  Hardware devices 
constantly change and update.  Requiring an operating system that can work with and 
support each new device is important.  An indicator of active maintenance is having 
recent software releases. 
(2)  Recent Updates to Software.  Recent software updates is part 
of the suggested requirement for active maintenance.  Debugging software that is no 
longer maintained will slow down development of the prototype.  If the software is no 
longer actively maintained, the kernel kit must have a stable release.   
(3)  Encourage Feedback.  A community that encourages feedback 
with the use of the operating system or kernel kit is a nice part of active maintenance. 
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c. Debugging Support 
A suggested helpful requirement is that the targeted operating system or 
kernel kit will provide means to debug the prototype.  It may not be feasible to have a 
high level rich debugging environment for debugging the prototype.  Providing a GDB 
stub with debugging hooks in the code to step through the executing code is enough to 
meet the suggested requirement. 
B. KERNEL KIT CONSIDERED 
The kernel kits considered are listed with their various properties relevant to the 
selection process (See Table 1).  The kernel kits that have a ‘No’ tag associated with a 
mandatory requirement are eliminated from further consideration.  
Kernel 
Kit 
Developers Link X86 Stable 
Release 
Open 
Source 
Privilege 
Domains 
Simple 
Code 
Genera
tion 
Active 
Mainta
nence 
Debug 
Support 
Choices University 
of Illinois 
http://choice
s.cs.uiuc.ed
u 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ECos Cygnus, 
Red Hat, 
ECosCentri
c 
http://ecos.s
ourceware.
org/getstart.
html 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
OSKit University 
of Utah 
http://www.
cs.utah.edu
/flux/oskit 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Fiasco TUD-
Dresden, 
University 
of 
Technology 
http://os.inf.
tu-
dresden.de/
fiasco 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
K42 IBM http://domin
o.research.i
bm.com/co
mm/researc
h_projects.
nsf/pages/k
42.index.ht
ml 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pebble Bell Labs http://www. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  15 
bell-
labs.com/pr
oject/pebble 
Spin  University 
of 
Washington 
http://www.
cs.washingt
on.edu/rese
arch/project
s/spin/www 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
TinyOS  University 
of 
Washington 
http://www.
cs.washingt
on.edu/rese
arch/project
s/spin/www 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
MMLite Microsoft http://resear
ch.microsoft
.com/invisib
le 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Table 1.   Reviewed Kernel Kits. 
C. FINAL DETERMINATION 
After eliminating from the sample those operating systems or kernel kits that did 
not satisfactorily meet the mandatory and suggested requirements, two kernel kits were 
chosen for deeper consideration and analysis.  An analysis of the deciding factors and 
reasons for selection are given. 
1. Final Deciding Factors 
Eliminating most of the operating systems due to the previously stated reasons in 
Table 1 narrowed the choices to the following four systems:  Fiasco, Choices, ECos, and 
OSKit.   
a. Fiasco 
Fiasco is developed at TU Dresden.  It is compatible with the x86 L4 
microkernel.  It is a real-time preemptive kernel written in C++.  Fiasco’s adherence to 
the specification of the L4 microkernel makes it a desirable choice.  The downside is 
Fiasco is too specialized for what is needed by the prototype.  
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b. Choices 
Upon initial review, Choices did not appear to have a stable release that 
ran on the tested x86 platform.  Initially, the Choices operating system would not install.  
Debug support was not provided with Choices to remedy the situation.  Due to 
acknowledged author error, Choices was eliminated prematurely.  FiSh, a shell 
application, is included with Choices to run applications using the Choices operating 
system, making it a desirable choice.  Choices is designed for systems research at the 
university level.   
c. ECos 
ECos was developed in 1997 by Cygnus Solutions after success 
supporting GNU GCC and GNU GDB.  Cygnus Solutions built a real time operating 
system for their GNUPro tool suite.  ECos is a highly configurable embedded systems 
kernel built for many different types of architectures and platforms. 
The benefits of ECos are the following: ECos configurable tools are 
available in a GUI environment; it supports command line execution, memory pools for 
fixed sized memory allocation are used, remote GDB debugging is supported, and it has 
plenty of documentation. 
The disadvantages of ECos are the following: no memory protection is 
implemented, the latest stable release was in May 2003, and it lacks non-preemptive 
schedulers. 
d. OSKit 
OSKit was developed at the University of Utah to provide a platform to 
lessen the cost of doing operating system research and development. 
The benefits of OSKit are the following: modular design, brevity of code, 
remote GDB debugging support, a simple process library, online documentation, non-
preemptive scheduling, and adequate sample code for the various kernel features 
(threading, multitasking, timers, etc.). 
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The disadvantages of OSKit are the following: the x86 LDT is not used, 
and the kernel kit developers released the last stable update in March 2002. 
2. Final Selection 
Of the four kernel kits, OSKit and ECos were selected for more critical review.  
Fiasco was too specialized for what was needed by the prototype and therefore was not 
considered.  Choosing between OSKit and ECos was difficult.  Not surprisingly, ECos 
provided GNU GDB debugging support.  OSKit also provided the ability to add GDB 
stub controls for the GDB debugger to work remotely.  Both operating systems are built 
to be modular and highly configurable.  ECos and OSKit provide reasonable 
documentation, installation ease, and make file support.  Neither had recent stable 
releases, forcing any development to be done on older hardware and operating systems.  
For enabling development, ECos exceeded expectations by providing command line 
execution of the created binaries to speed up development time.  ECos also appeared 
more able to meet the needs of the prototype with regard to static memory allocation and 
memory pools.  However, coding in OSKit was easier, and the kernel is more developed 
for kernel and user space separation. 
In the end, the simplicity of OSKit made it the better choice.  It has few 
dependencies between components.  Unlike ECos it has existing libraries for multitasking 
of processes to support kernel and user tasks.  In the final analysis, OSKit proved the 
better choice, as static non-preemptive scheduling and memory partitioning for multi-
tasked processes are highly attractive, and OSKit seems to provide the simplest platform 
to enable these.  An implementation was built using OSKit to provide memory 
partitioning and the sharing of resources among processes. 
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IV. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
The LPSK prototype is built by enhancing the configurable operating system, 
OSKit.  OSKit separates memory between the kernel space and user space through 
paging.  User processes have separate address spaces.  In OSKit, data can be transfered 
between user processes using memory resources managed by the memory manager.  The 
prototype enables the system to govern rules established by the configuration file of 
process and resource interaction.  The implementation allocates memory into partitions 
and memory resources within partitions.  The altered kernel mediates the memory sharing 
with paging and page fault trap handling.  This enhanced OSKit enables the separation of 
memory as defined by the configuration file.  The steps to enhance the kernel are as 
follows: setting up the development environment, using version control, implementing 
the configuration file, partitioning memory, creating and allocating resources, and 
altering user processes. 
A. SETTING UP THE DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
Setting up the development environment is necessary to build the prototype.  
Time was spent finding the most suitable configurable operating system.  Also, time was 
allocated to become familiar with OSKit to determine the least amount of changes needed 
for the required enhancements.  Having a working development environment enables the 
ability to become familiar with OSKit and build the prototype.  Building the development 
environment requires the following procedures: acquiring hardware, choosing a 
compatible software platform, installing OSKit, and implementing version control.  A 
more detailed explanation of setting up the development environment can be found in 
Appendix A. 
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1. Hardware  
Building the prototype using OSKit requires certain hardware.  An Intel PC with 
32MB of RAM and a 400MHZ processor and an old TNT graphics card will permit the 
prototype to run.  A machine with one GB or more of RAM will not permit the prototype 
to run without modifications to OSKit.    
2. Software Compatibility 
OSKit will not compile in all software environments.  The last stable release of 
OSKit was in 2002.  Consequently, OSKit will only compile with certain tools and 
versions.  For OSKit to compile, it requires: “GNU make, GNU CC version 2.7.x or 
version 2.95.2, and GNU binutils version 2.8.x, or 2.9.1 with BFD 2.9.1” [15].  Once a 
system is configured correctly with the compatible software required, OSKit can be 
compiled and the prototype built. 
3. Building the Prototype  
Building the prototype for the target machine involves compiling OSKit and 
linking with the code for the prototype.  Additionally, the prototype requires the Simple 
Process Library (SPROC) that comes packaged with OSKit in order to add multi-process 
capabilities to the prototype. 
a. Compiling  
Compiling OSKit involves a multi-step process.  The first step to 
compilation is to download the March 2002 release of OSKit into a directory on the 
target machine.  Next, one must execute the file named ‘configure’, type ‘make’, and 
finally ‘make install’.   The target machine now has the environment variables and the 
source code compiled to run test kernels.  These kernels must be linked together to 
include all of the necessary kernel building blocks.  One such test kernel is the prototype. 
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b. Linking Together the Kernel Image  
After the source code is compiled, the prototype must be linked.  The 
‘sproc’ directory under ‘oskit/examples/x86/’ has example code for multi-booting a 
kernel with user processes that use the Simple Process Library.  The multi-boot program 
called ‘mkmb2’ links with the kernel object, configuration file, swap file, and user 
process objects.  Running the multi-boot program correctly generates the prototype image 
file.  Now, the prototype is ready for changes.  To make needed changes to the prototype, 
version control is important.   
4. Using Version Control  
Version control provides a way to manage software updates, preventing loss of 
data and allowing revision to previous software versions.  For the project, the version 
control software Subversion was chosen.  
Subversion manages system changes.  It creates system backups by saving code 
for each new release automatically during code updates.  For the project, a Subversion 
server was set up.  A repository was created with a clean copy of OSKit.  Subsequent 
changes to OSKit are controlled through Subversion by monitoring check in and check 
out of the software.  
B. IMPLEMENTING CONFIGURATION FILE 
A requirement of the prototype is to allocate memory based on specifications in a 
kernel configuration file.  The configuration file must be read into kernel space before 
any allocation of resources or creation of user processes.  In the prototype this is 
accomplished by linking the configuration file to the kernel image and reading the 
configuration after booting the kernel image.  
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1. Configuration Data  
The configuration file as implemented includes data to define the following: 
partitions, processes, resources, partition flows, and resource flows.  These are 
implemented and handled in the prototype. 
a. Partitions 
Partitions are abstract entities to which resources are allocated.  Resources 
include both active and passive entities as well as execution time.   
b. Processes 
Processes have priority assignments used for scheduling within a partition 
and fixed assignments used for static scheduling of partition time slices.  Processes can 
act as both subjects and objects.  They act as subjects when they act on objects such as 
resources.  In addition, they act as objects when acted upon by other processes.  The 
access by processes to resources is mediated by flow rules enforced by the separation 
kernel. 
c. Resources 
This prototype deals exclusively with memory resources.  Other types of 
resources will be implemented in the future versions of the LPSK prototype. 
d. Partition Flows 
Partition Flows are directional flows that have a designated source 
partition and a designated destination partition.  The maximum number of partition flows 
in a system is the number of partitions in the system multiplied by one less than the 
number of partitions in the system.  The access modes possible in partition flows are the 
following: read, write, and read/write. 
In the prototype, every access mode is addressed.  Execute reads and 
execute writes are not permitted.  An execute read is an instruction that reads the current 
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instruction pointer.  An execute write is an instruction that writes to the current 
instruction pointer.  Page faults due to attempted execute reads or writes will terminate 
the process.    An execute read or write is known to be attempted when the instruction 
pointer and page fault address in the cr2 register contain the same value.  A read happens 
when a process stores the contents of memory into a register or memory.  A write occurs 
whenever contents in memory or in a register are written to a memory location.   
e. Resources Flows 
Resource flows are directional flows that have an association between a 
resource and a process with a defined access mode.  The association depends on the 
access mode.  The access modes allowed are read, write, and read/write.  The maximum 
number of resource flows in a system is the number of resources in the system multiplied 
by the number of processes in the system.   
In the prototype, a memory access cannot occur unless there is a defined 
partition flow and resource flow with the access privileges to permit the access.  If any 
one of the two flows does not exist, the process is terminated. 
2. Porting the Configuration File to the Prototype  
The prototype reads the configuration file to obtain the permitted flows, create 
partitions, allocate resources, and manage processes.  The configuration data is linked 
into the kernel prototype image.   
a. The Application to Construct the Configuration File 
An application called configapp was built to write the configuration data 
directly to a file in binary form.  The source of this application appears in Appendix C 
This application uses the same compiler and the same configuration header file as the 
prototype.  The data structure LPSKconfig is written to file by configapp and is the same 
data structure used to retrieve the data by the prototype during execution.  There are key 
reasons this application is using the same compiler and defined data structure from the 
configuration header file as the prototype. 
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First, the same GCC compiler is used for compiling both the prototype and 
configapp.  This is to prevent any issues of different data types having different sizes.   
Second, the LPSKconfig structure is reused, allowing configuration data 
to be written and read properly in the correct order and with the correct size.  This is the 
same structure used by both the prototype to store the configuration file data and by 
configapp. 
b. Binary Reading of the Configuration File 
To read the binary information in the configuration file, the prototype 
allocates memory for the LPSKconfig structure and then reads the binary into the 
structure.  Since the configuration file is linked into the kernel image, the file has to be 
retrieved using the procedure provided by OSKit, ‘oskit_absio_read’. 
C. PARTITIONING OF MEMORY 
The prototype has the ability to separate memory locations into partitions access 
to which is mediated by the kernel in accordance with the configuration.  Partitioning 
results from separating memory through paging, implementing a page fault trap handler, 
and defining partition flows.    
1. Partitioning via Paging  
Paging provides separation of memory between partitions.  When a user-domain 
process is created, a check is made to determine to which partition the process is 
allocated.  The minimum and maximum memory addresses of the partition are applied to 
the user-domain process.  The prototype maps the pages to physical memory based on 
these addresses for use by the user-domain process.  After the pages are mapped for the 
process, the process is initialized and started in user mode.  The mapping is intentional.  
Any attempt by the user-domain process to access pages that are not mapped to its 
partition results in a hardware page fault.  
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a. Hardware Page Faults 
Whenever there is an access to a page not mapped within physical 
memory, hardware sends an interrupt, which results in a page fault.  A page fault trap 
handler was constructed for the prototype to handle the page fault interrupts sent by 
hardware.  The page fault handler built into the prototype does not handle all Intel x86 
opcodes that may cause page faults.  Instead it demonstrates that page faults may be 
handled.  All major types of memory access handling are addressed by the page fault 
handler, which are termed as memory access classes.  These memory access classes are: 
constant to memory, memory address to register, memory pointed by a register to 
register, register to memory pointed by a register, incrementing or decrementing memory, 
pushing or popping a memory address, memory to memory, memory to register, register 
to memory, pushing memory, popping memory, and accessing program counter address.  
Also handled are the following memory access modes: read, and write.  A read execute or 
write execute page fault will terminate the process.    
2. Page Fault Trap Handler  
The prototype’s page fault trap handler reads the line of code that caused the fault, 
checks flows to determine access permissions, handles the line of code, and returns 
control to the next line of code following the line of code that caused the page fault.  The 
trap handler terminates any process that performs an illegal access.   
a. Handling Paging 
A kernel data structure describes the address space of each 
partition/process in terms of pages.  If a page fault occurs, this database is referenced.  If 
the page is in the address space to which the process has permission for the access mode 
attempted, then the kernel executes the instruction that initiated the memory access and 
returns control following the instruction, otherwise the process is terminated. 
 
 
  26 
b. Handling of Opcodes 
Before handling the requested access, the memory access attempt must be 
determined.  The opcode that caused the page fault determines the memory access 
attempt.  If the memory access is deemed legal, the opcode is handled in the kernel-
domain within the trap handler.  The opcode is handled by editing the stored state of the 
processor when the trap occurred, and this stored state becomes the state of the processor 
when control returns back to the process in the user-domain.  The ability to read and 
write the state of the processor when the trap occurred allows the handling of all page 
fault traps used for the purposes of the prototype. 
The prototype has a case statement that handles two-byte value inputs with 
a case statement in the default section that handles one-byte value inputs.  This is done to 
efficiently handle the opcodes that may be one or two bytes in length.  Any opcode 
unhandled will cause the termination of the process.  After a successful operation is 
performed, the mapping of the required page will be removed and the original mapping 
restored.  Once this mapping has been performed, execution can be returned to the user-
domain process.  Before this operation can occur, permissions are checked to determine 
that the access attempt mode is allowed. 
3. Permission Handling  
The page fault trap handler checks the permissions allowed.  These permissions 
are between the source and destination partitions of the memory attempt and the resource 
being accessed.  Retrieving the process ID determines origin of the page fault.  Using this 
ID, the partition flows and resource flows that exist for this process are obtained and the 
access modes allowed are read.  A required partition flow must exist to permit the access.  
If the access is permitted, another check is made to determine that a resource flow exists 
with the required access permission.  If both flows exist, access to the page is granted. 
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a. Returning to User Process 
To return execution back to the user process, the prototype must prevent 
the same page fault from occurring again.  An infinite loop will occur if execution is 
returned without advancing the instruction pointer; the process will execute the same 
operation that caused the page fault.  To solve this problem, the instruction pointer must 
be updated to skip past the instruction that caused the page fault.  These updated values 
are based on the instruction set of the hardware.  For example, a four byte instruction is 
handled by incrementing the instruction pointer by four.  Upon performing this operation, 
execution can return back to the process, and successful handling of memory partitions 
and resources is complete. 
The enhanced changes made to OSKit to build the LPSK prototype 
enforce memory separation into partitions and the ability of processes to access data 
resources as defined by the configuration file.  These enhanced changes made to the 
original OSKit release of snapshot 20020317 are detailed in Appendix C. 
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V. PROTOTYPE TESTING AND RESULTS 
This chapter deals with the functional testing of the prototype and the results.  The 
prototype has the ability to separate memory locations into partitions and resources that 
the kernel mediates.  Partitioning is the result from separating memory through paging, 
implementing a page fault trap handler, and defining partition flows.  Resource separation 
results from defining resource flows that are checked in the page fault trap handler when 
a process in another partition attempts access.  This prototype is tested to ensure that only 
the correct memory based accesses occur between partitions and resources.  These are 
specified by the policy encoded in the configuration file.   
Individual prototype tests are conducted using a development machine and a 
testing machine.  The development machine runs the prototype that has a GNU Project 
Debugger (GDB) stub to permit remote debugging from the testing machine.  The testing 
machine runs the GDB debugger remotely connecting to the GDB stub via a serial link. 
Development Machine
Serial
1 User
3 PC
1 KVM Switch
1 Terminal
Symbol Count Description
System Environment
Legend
Testing Machine
Version Control Server
KVM Cables
KVM Cables
TCP/IP
Backup of 
Prototype
Prototype w/ 
GDB Stub
&
Configuration File
GDB Debugger
 
Figure 1.   System Topology. 
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The subsequent section describes the following: test plan, setup, functional 
testing, the results, and any problems encountered. 
A. TEST PLAN 
Tests are conducted on all memory access classes ensuring the access modes of 
read, write, read/write, and execute are tested systematically.  Memory access classes 
discussed here are memory accesses that are possible in x86 architectures without 
specifying a specific register, address, or value.  The memory access classes are as 
follows: constant to memory, memory address to register, memory pointed by a register 
to register, register to memory pointed by a register, incrementing or decrementing 
memory, pushing or popping a memory address, memory to memory, memory to register, 
register to memory, pushing memory, popping memory, and accessing program counter 
address. 
Each test results in a success or a failure.  The results are annotated with a success 
or failure tag in Table 3.  A success result occurs when the memory access class tested is 
properly handled via the prototype’s trap handling.  A failure happens when the memory 
access class is not handled via the prototype’s trap handling. 
B. FUNCTIONAL TESTING 
Performing the functional tests on the prototype requires setting up an 
environment based on policy which is derived from the configuration file instantiation.  
The testing environment requires certain characteristics to be initialized in the following: 
processes, partitions, resources, partition flows, and resource flows (see Figure 2).  To 
perform the functional tests, various values in the resources are accessed in different 
modes and the subsequent state is inspected. 
1. Address Values  
The address values accessed in the tests are the virtual addresses ‘0xa0009fac’ 
and ‘0xa0009fa8’.  These are the resource locations of two resources in Partition 2.  The 
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tests involve changing the initial values, instructions, and access modes and verifying that 
the correct values reside in the correct memory locations. 
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Partition Flow
Memory Address 
Range
Symbol Description
Prototype Test Environment
Legend
NOTE: Processes have implicit access to resources in the same partition
 
Figure 2.   Testing Topology. 
2. Test Cases  
Test cases verify that the various accesses to memory are constrained correctly.  
These test cases consist of all the opcodes handled by the prototype.  The AC8 test case is 
a success when the memory access attempt results in the termination of the user process 
that made the attempt.  The other test cases are considered a success when a memory 
access attempt by an instruction running in user mode causes a page fault and is properly 
handled by updating the system state (or not) according to policy, then returning back to 
the user process at the next instruction.  These tests cases consist of the tests described in 
Table 2.   
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Test Access Type Description 
AC1 Write Constant to Memory Test AC1 certifies the prototype handles memory accesses due to 
copying a constant value into a memory location. 
AC2 None Memory Address to 
Register 
Test AC2 certifies the prototype handles memory accesses due to 
copying a memory address into a register. 
AC3 Read Memory Pointed by a 
Register to Register 
Test AC3 certifies the prototype handles memory accesses due to 
copying memory referenced by a register into a register. 
AC4 Write Register to Memory 
Pointed by a Register 
Test AC4 certifies the prototype handles memory accesses due to 
copying values in a register into memory referenced by a register. 
AC5 Write Incrementing or 
Decrementing Memory 
Test AC5 certifies the prototype handles memory accesses due to 
incrementing or decrementing. 
AC6 None Pushing or Popping 
Memory Address 
Test AC6 certifies the prototype handles memory accesses due to 
pushing or popping a memory address onto or off of the stack. 
AC7 Read & 
Write 
Memory to Memory Test AC7 certifies the prototype handles memory accesses due to 
copying directly memory from one location to another. 
AC8 Read Memory to Register Test AC8 certifies the prototype handles memory accesses due to 
copying memory into a register. 
AC9 Write Register to Memory Test AC9 certifies the prototype handles memory accesses due to 
copying a register’s contents to memory. 
AC10 Read  Pushing Memory Test AC10 certifies the prototype handles memory accesses due to 
pushing memory onto the stack. 
AC11 Write Popping Memory Test AC11 certifies the prototype handles memory accesses due to 
popping values off of the stack into memory. 
AC12 Execute Accessing Program 
Counter Address 
Test AC12 certifies the prototype handles memory accesses due to 
trying to access the instruction pointer address. 
Table 2.   Memory Access Class Test Descriptions. 
C. RESULTS 
The functional tests were performed against the prototype instance detailed in 
Figure 2, and the results were collected.  The data collected was checked to verify that the 
prototype functions as intended.  The results of the successes and failures of the test cases 
run are displayed in Table 3. 
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Test Access Type Expected Result Actual Result 
AC1 Write Constant to Memory Success Success 
AC2 None Memory Address to Register Failure Failure 
AC3 Read Memory Pointed by a Register to Register Success Success 
AC4 Write Register to Memory Pointed by a Register Success Success 
AC5 Write Incrementing or Decrementing Memory Success Success 
AC6 None Pushing or Popping Memory Address Failure Failure 
AC7 Read & Write Memory to Memory Success Success 
AC8 Read Memory to Register Success Success 
AC9 Write Register to Memory Success Success 
AC10 Read Pushing Memory Success Success 
AC11 Write Popping Memory Success Success 
AC12 Execute Accessing Program Counter Address Success Success 
Table 3.   Test Results. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the test results demonstrated that the prototype did in 
fact handle all of the memory access classes as expected. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
This chapter discusses the conclusions and future work of the LPSK prototype to 
supplement the TCX Project. 
A. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis was to construct a prototype of certain aspects of the 
functionality for a high assurance separation kernel that reflects the Principle of Least 
Privilege (PoLP) [1] and that will enable the TCX Project.  By implementing partitioning 
of memory and monitoring memory resources within the separation kernel prototype, the 
prototype allows the Principle of Least Privilege to be realized for memory resources of 
the LPSK prototype.  The tests described in Chapter V show that the approach taken to 
monitor memory accesses between partitions is feasible and may be used in the TCX 
Project to protect memory.   
The approach taken of using paging to prevent unwarranted accesses as described 
in this thesis enforces rules mandated by the configuration file in a straightforward 
manner.  Also, this approach prevents processes from accessing the instruction pointer to 
point to or read locations in other partitions.       
Implementation of this prototype leads to ideas for future work that would be of 
benefit to the TCX Project. 
B. FUTURE WORK  
During the development of this thesis work, four key areas were found to warrant 
future work.   
1. Complete Handling of Opcodes in the Page Trap Handler 
Complete handling of all of the x86 opcodes that may cause page faults is not 
fully implemented in the prototype’s page trap handler.  The proof of concept work is 
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done to show that all of the x86 opcodes can be implemented.  Further work in this area 
would be to implement the complete set.   
2. Static Scheduling 
The prototype reads the configuration file to determine the number of scheduled 
ticks for each process and sends this to the scheduler.  The scheduler, while sufficient for 
this prototype, is not fully implemented.  Further work may be done in this area. 
3. Handling Other Resource Types  
This work implements memory resource handling in the LPSK prototype.  Further 
work is necessary to handle other resource types.    
4. Efficient Caching of Resource Accesses  
The efficiency of handling memory accesses outside of a process’ partition can be 
improved by building into the prototype caching mechanisms to minimize the number of 
page faults.  Implementing a caching mechanism could benefit the work done by 
providing the benefits this approach offers while minimizing the performance penalties.  
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APPENDIX A: INSTALLATION ACTIVITIES 
A. ENIVRONMENT INSTALLATION 
The procedures taken to install the working environment are as follows: 
connecting computers via serial link, installing Linux Red Hat 7.2, installing GRUB, and 
connecting to a Subversion server. 
1. Serial Link Connection 
To debug the prototype remotely with a GDB debugger, the selected test machine 
and development machine are connected via a serial line.  This serial line is connected via 
serial ports and a cable.  The cable used is a serial crossover cable to permit proper 
communication.  
2. Linux Installation 
All of the procedures in this thesis are run with Linux Red Hat 7.2 installed on 
both machines.  After installing and running Linux out of the box on the both machines, 
GRUB needs to be installed on the selected development machine.  Linux Red Hat 7.2 
was chosen for ease of use with OSKit. 
3. GRUB Installation 
Installing the GRUB package can be done following the Red Hat documentation 
to install GRUB since it will not be installed via the Red Hat Linux installation process.  
After the GRUB package is loaded, one must open a root shell command prompt and run 
the command, ‘/sbin/grub-install <partition>’, where ‘<partition>’ is the location of the 
first primary partition.  This will install the GRUB stage 1 boot loader, “to the MBR of 
the master IDE device and on the primary IDE bus”.  After running these procedures to 
install GRUB, the GRUB graphical loader will display on boot [16]. 
After GRUB is installed, the ‘grub.conf’ file is added and should be edited to 
include the prototype image file that will be run.  The way this is done is by copying the 
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title, root, and kernel lines of the Linux parts in the ‘grub.conf’ file and editing the copied 
lines with the title line changed to describe the LPSK prototype and the kernel line 
changed to specify the location of the prototype image. 
4. Connecting to Subversion Server 
To install the SVN client in the Linux environment, Apache Runtime (APR) as 
well as Subversion has to be installed.  SVN with APR can be set up in many different 
ways, running the following commands is one way: 
cd / 
wget http://subversion.tigris.org/downloads/subversion-1.4.4.tar.gz 
tar –zxf subversion-1.4.4.tar.gz 
cd subversion-1.4.4 
svn co http://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr/branches/0.9.x apr 
cd apr 
./buildconf 
./configure 
make 
cd .. 
svn co http://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr-util/branches/0.9.x apr-util 
cd apr-util 
./buildconf 
./configure –with-apr=/subversion-1.4.4/apr 
make 
cd .. 
./configure 
make  
make install 
A Subversion repository was set up on the version control server.  To populate the 
repository a Subversion client is installed and the “svn import” command is issued.  The 
original OSKit files were imported into the repository using this procedure.  Checking in 
and checking out files allows OSKit to be modified and the LPSK prototype built.  To 
check-in and check-out existing files of the OSKit repository, the following commands 
are used, where ‘<username>’ represents the username, ‘<password>’ represents the 
password, ‘<message>’ represents the message to save, and ‘<repository location>’ 
represents the location of the repository:  
svn ci –username <username> --password <password> -m “<message>”  
svn co <repository location> –username <username> --password <password>   
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Any additional files that are made during the development of the LPSK prototype 
are added by issuing the ‘svn add <filename>’ command, where ‘<filename>’ represents 
the file to be added to the repository [17]-[19]. 
B. OSKIT INSTALLATION 
Installing OSKit in the environment described Section A of this Appendix 
involves downloading OSKit’s “St. Patrick’s Day” snapshot from the Flux website, 
http://www.cs.utah.edu/flux/oskit/software.html, untaring, and installing.  Complete the 
following steps and OSKit and the kernel image that will become the prototype will be 
compiled and ready for modification: 
 
mkdir /oskit-dev 
cd /oskit-dev 
wget ftp://flux.cs.utah.edu/flux/oskit/oskit-20020317.tar.gz 
tar –zxf oskit-20020317.tar.gz 
cd oskit-20020317 
./configure 
make 
make install 
cd examples/x86/sproc 
make Image 
mkmb2 kernel swapfile usermain_testsproc usermain_hello 
OSKit has a variety of sample kernels that can be created in different ways.  See 
the OSKit documentation for more information [20].  
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APPENDIX B: TEST PROCEDURES 
The various tests run against the memory access classes and their results are 
discussed in Chapter V.  A memory access class is a memory access performed by an 
instruction using a nonspecific register, address, or value.  The memory access classes are 
as follows: constant to memory, memory address to register, memory pointed by a 
register to register, register to memory pointed by a register, incrementing or 
decrementing memory, pushing or popping a memory address, memory to memory, 
memory to register, register to memory, pushing memory, popping memory, and 
accessing program counter.  The technical details of how these tests were performed 
against the memory access classes are described in this Appendix.  The relative source 
code not listed in this Appendix can be found in Appendix C. 
OSKit has the ability to provide GNU debugger (GDB) stub routines which can 
be called by calling various OSKit included routines.  The LPSK prototype enables GDB 
debugging upon initialization with the following code that comes with OSKit: 
extern struct termios base_raw_termios,base_cooked_termios; 
printf("setting serial port for gdb\n"); 
base_raw_termios.c_ispeed = B38400; 
base_raw_termios.c_ospeed = B38400; 
base_cooked_termios.c_ispeed = B38400; 
base_cooked_termios.c_ospeed = B38400; 
gdb_pc_com_init(1, &base_raw_termios); 
  
gdb_trap_mask = (1 <<T_PAGE_FAULT) | (1 << T_NO_FPU); 
printf("break!\n"); 
gdb_breakpoint(); 
 
Testing the various memory access classes was performed by creating two user-
domain processes with the source code detailed in the files ‘usermain_testsproc.c’ and 
‘usermain_hello.c’.  The ‘usermain_testsproc.c’ file contains the source code that 
generates the opcodes that are used to test the various access classes.  The 
‘usermain_hello.c’ file contains the source code to display the data contained in the 
resources that are accessed by the memory accesses.  The memory accesses are 
performed by the code found in the ‘usermain_testsproc.c’ file.  
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The GNU application objdump was used to view the outputted assembly and 
machine code of the ‘usermain_testsproc.o’ object file.  The 
‘objdump -D <object file><dump file>’ command was used to dump the assembly and 
machine code of the ‘<object file>’ file into the ‘<dump file>’ file.  This was done to 
verify that the C code written in the user-domain processes source code produces the 
correct x86 opcodes that are implemented in the LPSK prototype.   
A. TESTING ACCESS CLASSES 
All access classes detailed in Chapter V were tested.  All the tests conducted 
ensure: the instruction executes in user mode, causes a page fault, and is properly handled 
by returning back to the original user process at the next instruction.  The instructions 
used to test each access class are detailed in this section. 
1. Constant to Memory 
The two-byte opcode ‘0x05C7’ tests the accessibility of storing a value to 
memory.  The ‘movl $0x64, 0xA0009fA8’ instruction produces this opcode.   
2. Memory Address to Register 
The one-byte opcode ‘0xB8’ tests the accessibility of storing a memory address to 
a register.  The ‘mov 0xA00DBEEF, %eax’ instruction generates the one-byte opcode.  
3. Memory Pointed by a Register to Register 
The ability of storing memory pointed by a register into a register is tested with 
the two-byte opcode ‘0x008B’ via the ‘mov (%eax), %eax’ instruction.  
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4. Register to Memory Pointed by a Register 
The two-byte opcode ‘0x0289’ via the ‘mov %eax, (%edx)’ instruction tests 
register to memory pointed by a register access.  This memory access copies the register 
value to memory a register points to.  
5. Incrementing/Decrementing Memory 
The two-byte opcodes ‘0x0583’ and ‘0x05FF’ (which were the ‘addl 0x04, 
0xA0009FAC’ and ‘incl 0xA0009FA8’ instructions) tests the ability to access 
incrementing or decrementing memory.    
6. Pushing/Popping Memory Address 
The single-byte opcode ‘0x68’ is generated using the ‘push $0xA000BEEF’ 
instruction and tests the ability to access pushing a memory address onto the stack.  The 
single-byte opcode ‘0x58’, is generated using the “pop %eax” instruction and follows the 
‘push $0xA000BEEF’ instruction testing the ability to pop a memory address off of the 
stack. 
7. Memory to Memory 
The access type that involves copying memory to memory is tested with the two-
byte opcode ‘0xA4f3’.  This opcode is the ‘repz movsb %ds:(%esi), %es:(%edi)’ 
instruction.  The opcode was realized using the code statement 
‘memmove(0x0A0009FA8, 0xA0009FAC, 1)’ in C. 
8. Memory to Register 
Two opcodes: the two-byte ‘0x158B’ and one-byte ‘0xA1’, test the accesses 
involving storing memory into a register.  The ‘mov 0xA0009FAC, %edx’ instruction 
generates the two-byte opcode and the ‘mov 0xA0009FA8, %eax’ instruction generates 
the one-byte opcode. 
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9. Register to Memory 
The access type that involves copying register to memory is tested with the one-
byte opcode ‘0xa3’.  The ‘mov %eax, 0xA0009FA8’ instruction generates this one-byte 
opcode. 
10. Pushing Memory 
The access of pushing memory is tested with the two-byte opcode ‘0x35FF’.  The 
‘pushl 0xA0009FA8’ instruction generates this two-byte opcode. 
11. Popping Memory 
The access type that involves popping memory is tested with the two-byte opcode 
‘0x058F’.  The ‘popl 0xA0009FAC’ instruction generates this two-byte opcode. 
12. Accessing Program Counter Address 
The ‘jmp 0xA000A072’ instruction tests the access of the instruction pointer.  
The instruction always returns with both the cr2 register and the eip register in the saved 
state containing the same value.  The instruction runs in user mode, causing a page fault, 
and terminates properly in the trap handler, thus killing the user process.   
B. TESTING THE PAGE FAULT TRAP HANDLER 
During the testing of the various access classes, checks were made to verify that 
the page faults issued were properly handled in the page fault trap handler.  The tests 
were done via GDB with various ‘assert’ and ‘printf’ statements.  The code executed on 
every page fault when entering the page fault handler is as follows: 
printf("handler proc 0x8%x !\n",(int)sthread->st_process);  
printf("eip address: %x \n", ts->eip); 
if(!from_user){//if kernel page fault   
printf("kernel\n"); //or double fault then kill process 
  return 1; //Don't allow double faults! So kill process 
} 
printf("ERR!: thread = %d, process = %p, signo = %d, " 
 "code = %d, frame = %p\n", (int)pthread_self(),  
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sthread->st_process, signo, code, ts); 
printf("page fault address 0x%x\n", cr2); 
printf("eip address: %x value: %x \n", ts->eip,  
*(long*)(ts->eip)); 
/* if page fault from accessing kernel memory, kill proc*/ 
if(cr2 < OSKIT_UVM_MINUSER_ADDRESS) return 1; 
            //sanity check 
if((i = getVMSpace(cr2)) == -1) return 1;//no partition  
            //so kill process  
The process was checked to verify that the process pid was the correct pid 
expected from the process that cause the page fault.  Double faults and nested traps were 
detected.  The eip register was checked by stepping through code and making sure the 
user-domain process’ eip address of the instruction that caused the page fault was the 
same that was printed in the page fault handler.  It was also checked to make sure that 
every page fault handled in the trap handler was handled properly with the correct eip 
address returned pointing to the next instruction of the instruction that caused the page 
fault.  Every x86 opcode that the LPSK prototype handles was checked and verified. 
The page fault trap handler was tested against every memory access class by 
reading and writing various values to the defined resources.  The code used to test the 
handling of the access classes by the prototype are listed in Appendix C in the files, 
‘usermain_testsproc.c’ and ‘kernel.c’, with the binary code and assembly code of 
‘usermain_testsproc.c’ and a description of which test is performed by which line of 
assembly is listed in the file named ‘dump’. 
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APPENDIX C: PROTOTYPE CODE IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation of the Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) prototype 
consists of downloading, installing, and modifying the OSKit snapshot version 20020317 
as described in Appendix A.  The files added or modified to the existing OSKit are listed 
in this Appendix with the source for review.  The files are listed as indexed from the root 
location where OSKit is installed.  If the instructions given in Appendix A were followed 
with strict adherence, the root development location is ‘/oskit-dev/’. 
A. OSKIT/SPROC.H 
The ‘oskit/sproc.h’ file was modified with the only change being done to the 
‘oskit_sproc_create’ function prototype.  
/* create a process and assign a process description */ 
/* added min & max for residing processes in partitions */ 
oskit_error_t oskit_sproc_create(const struct  
                        oskit_sproc_desc *desc, 
     oskit_size_t size, oskit_size_t min, 
     oskit_size_t max, //DWC 4/5/2007 
     struct oskit_sproc *outproc); 
B. OSKIT/UVM.H 
The ‘oskit/uvm.h’ file was modified with the only change being done to the 
‘oskit_uvm_create’ function prototype.  
/* create a vmspace */ //DWC 4/5/2007 
/* added min and max for creating vmspaces with fixed 
   min and max constraints for partitioning */ 
oskit_error_t oskit_uvm_create(oskit_size_t size,    
                   oskit_size_t min, oskit_size_t max,      
                   oskit_vmspace_t *out_vm);  
C. THREADS/SCHED_POSIX/SCHED_POSIX.C 
The ‘threads/sched_posix/sched_posix.c’ file was modified to add ticks to round 
robin scheduler.   
/* added ticks to processes for round robin scheduler */ 
Line 260:pthread->ticks = pthread->interval_ticks; 
/* added ticks to processes for round robin scheduler */  
Line 433:pthread->ticks = pthread->interval_ticks; 
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D. THREADS/PTHREAD_CREATE.C 
The ‘threads/pthread_create.c’ file was modified to add ticks to round robin 
scheduler.  
/* added ticks to processes for round robin scheduler */  
Line 199:pthread->interval_ticks=attr->sched_ticks; 
E. UVM/SPROC/SPROC.C 
The ‘uvm/sproc/sproc.c’ file was modified with the only change being done to the 
‘oskit_sproc_create’ function to permit partitioning of memory.  
extern oskit_error_t 
oskit_sproc_create(const struct oskit_sproc_desc *desc,    
oskit_size_t size, oskit_size_t min, oskit_size_t max,   
struct oskit_sproc *outproc)  
//DWC 4/5/2007 added min and max to create partitions 
{ 
    oskit_error_t error; 
    /* added min and max to create partitions */ 
    error = oskit_uvm_create(size, min, max,  
                            &outproc->sp_vm);//DWC 4/5/2007 
    if (error) { 
 return error; 
    } 
 
    queue_init(&outproc->sp_thread_head); 
    pthread_mutex_init(&outproc->sp_lock, NULL); 
 
    /* Install our uvm handler */ 
    oskit_uvm_handler_set(outproc->sp_vm,   
                          oskit_sproc_uvm_handler); 
 
    outproc->sp_desc = desc; 
    return 0; 
} 
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F. UVM/UVM/OSKIT_UVM.C 
The ‘uvm/uvm/oskit_uvm.c’ file was modified with the only change was to the 
‘oskit_uvm_create’ function to permit partitioning of memory.  
/* 
 * API: Create a vmspace 
 */ 
/* added changes to permit partitioning */ 
extern oskit_error_t 
oskit_uvm_create(oskit_size_t size, oskit_size_t min,  
                 oskit_size_t max,  
                 oskit_vmspace_t *out_vm) //DWC 4/5/2007 
{ 
    oskit_vmspace_t p; 
    oskit_error_t error; 
 
    if (min + size > max) { //DWC 4/5/2007 
 return OSKIT_EINVAL; 
    } 
 
    error = oskit_uvm_vmspace_alloc(&p); 
    if (error) { 
 return error; 
    } 
 
    UVM_LOCK; 
    /* allocate uvmspace by min and max of partition */ 
    p->vm_proc.p_vmspace = uvmspace_alloc(min,  
       min + size, 1); //DWC 4/5/2007 
    UVM_UNLOCK; 
    *out_vm = p; 
 
    return 0; 
} 
G. EXAMPLES/X86/SPROC/KERNEL.H 
The ‘examples/x86/sproc/kernel.h’ file contains the function prototypes and 
defines used for the ‘kernel.c’ file.  
#ifndef _KERNEL_H_ 
#define _KERNEL_H_ 
 
/* # of iteration */ 
#define NITER  1     
/* # of processes run in parallel */ 
#define NPROCESS 3  
/* # of threads in a single process */ 
#define NTHREAD  1    
/* user stack size */ 
#define USER_STACK_SIZE (16*1024) 
/* for printing of debugging content */ 
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extern int oskit_sproc_debug; 
/* initialization for system calls */ 
extern int syscall_init(void); 
/* create process and run in user-domain */ 
static void execute_process(void *); 
/* trap handler to handle page faults */ 
static int handler(struct oskit_sproc_thread *sth,  
                   int signo, int code,  
                   struct trap_state *frame); 
 
/* structure used for system calls */ 
extern struct oskit_sproc_sysent my_syscall_tab[]; 
 
#endif /*KERNEL.H*/ 
H. EXAMPLES/X86/SPROC/CONFIG.H 
The ‘examples/x86/sproc/config.h’ file contains the structures and defines used by 
‘kernel.c’ and ‘configapp.c’ for the configuration file structure.  
#ifndef _CONFIG_H_ 
#define _CONFIG_H_ 
 
 
#define MAX_PROCESSES 20 //define for max # of processes 
#define MAX_PARTITIONS 8 //define for max # of partitions 
#define MAX_RESOURCES 20 //define for max # of resources 
#define MAX_CVT 3 //not implemented yet 
#define MAX_AUTHS 20 //not implemented yet 
#define MAX_NAME_LEN 100 //define for policy names and  
                         //process file names 
#define DELAY 10 //define used for delaying program control 
 
typedef enum {FALSE=0, TRUE} BOOL; //add Boolean type 
/* access modes used for determining resource and partition 
   flow privileges */ 
typedef enum {N=0, R=2, W=3, RW=5} E_ACCESS_MODE;  
/* E_ABILITIES are not implemented yet */ 
typedef enum {RESTART=0, HALT, CONFIG_UPDATE} E_ABILITY; 
/* structure contains internal information for processes */ 
struct oskit_sproc_info{  
  char arg[MAX_NAME_LEN]; // string of c file of process  
  int proc_size; //partition size 
  long proc_min_addr; //partition min address for process 
  long proc_max_addr; //partition max address for process 
  long proc_heap_start_addr;   
  long proc_heap_size; 
  int sched_ticks; // ticks for scheduler 
  pthread_attr_t *attr; //loaded during process create  
  struct oskit_vmspace *sp_vm; //created during proc init 
  int process_id; //pid of the process 
}; 
/* structure containing information for partitions */ 
struct partition{ 
  int partition_id; 
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  int resource_ids[MAX_RESOURCES]; 
  int process_ids[MAX_PROCESSES]; 
  long part_min_addr; 
  long part_size; 
  int timeSlice; 
}; 
/* structure containing information for processes */ 
struct process{ 
  int process_id; 
  int priority; 
  struct oskit_sproc_info info; 
}; 
/* structure containing information for resources */ 
struct resource{ 
  int resource_id; 
  int resource_type; 
  long res_min_addr; 
  long res_size; 
}; 
/* structure not yet implemented */ 
struct sub_auth{ 
  int process_id; //aka "subject" 
  E_ABILITY ability_id; 
}; 
/* structure containing information for partition flows */ 
struct partFlowTuple{ 
  int partition_id_from; 
  int partition_id_to; 
  E_ACCESS_MODE access_mode; 
}; 
/* structure containing information for resource flows */   
struct resFlowTuple{ 
  int process_id; 
  int resource_id; 
  E_ACCESS_MODE access_mode; 
}; 
/* struct of configuration file info for the prototype */ 
struct LPSKconfig{ 
  int id; //aka "next" 
  int version; 
  int num_of_partitions; 
  int num_of_processes; 
  int num_of_resources; 
  int num_of_part_flows; 
  int num_of_res_flows; 
  char policy[MAX_NAME_LEN]; 
  struct partition partitionList[MAX_PARTITIONS]; 
  struct resource resourceList[MAX_RESOURCES]; 
  struct sub_auth authList[MAX_AUTHS]; //not implemented 
  struct process processList[MAX_PROCESSES]; 
  struct partFlowTuple   
           partFlows[MAX_PARTITIONS*MAX_PARTITIONS]; 
  struct resFlowTuple  
           resFlows[MAX_PROCESSES*MAX_RESOURCES]; 
}; 
/* structure not yet implemented */ 
struct LPSKConfigVectorTable{ //not implemented yet 
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  int version; 
  int curr_conf_id; 
  struct LPSKconfig CVT[MAX_CVT]; 
}; 
 
#endif /*CONFIG.H*/ 
I. EXAMPLES/X86/SPROC/USERMAIN_TESTSPROC.C 
The ‘examples/x86/sproc/usermain_testsproc.c’ file contains the test cases used to 
cause the memory accesses that are trapped by the page fault trap handler.  
/* 
 * Copyright (c) 2001 The University of Utah and the Flux  
 * Group.  All rights reserved. 
 *  
 * This file is part of the Flux OSKit.  The OSKit is free  
 * software, also known as "open source;" you can  
 * redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the  
 * GNU General Public License (GPL), version 2, as  
 * published by the Free Software Foundation (FSF).  To  
 * explore alternate licensing terms, contact the  
 * University of Utah at csl-dist@cs.utah.edu or +1-801- 
 * 585-3271. 
 * The OSKit is distributed in the hope that it will be  
 * useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the  
 * implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A  
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GPL for more details.  You  
 * should have received a copy of the GPL along with the  
 * OSKit; see the file COPYING.  If not, write to the FSF,  
 * 59 Temple Place #330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. 
 */ 
 
/* Sample user program */ 
 
#include <oskit/c/stdio.h> 
#include <oskit/c/malloc.h> 
#include "user_syscall.h" 
 
extern int errno; 
 
int 
main() 
{ 
  int pid; //Process Id 
  int rc;  
  int value; 
  char *val1, *val2; 
  pid = syscall_getpid(); 
  printf("Start process (pid %d)\n", pid); 
     
  syscall_sleep(6); 
  value = 99; 
  value++; 
  /* Test Pushing Memory Access Class */ 
  53 
  asm volatile( "push 0xA0009FA8\n\t"); 
  /* Test Popping Memory Access Class */ 
  asm volatile( "pop 0xA0009FAC\n\t"); 
  asm volatile( "mov $0x12, %eax\n\t"); 
  /* Test Register to Memory Access Class */ 
  asm volatile( "mov %eax, 0xA0009FA8\n\t"); 
  /* Test Constant to Memory Access Class */ 
  *(int*)0xA0009FA8 = value; 
  asm volatile( "push %eax\n\t"); 
  /* Test Pushing/Popping to Memory Address Access Class */ 
  asm volatile( "push $0xA000BEEF\n\t"); 
  asm volatile( "pop %eax\n\t"); 
  ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
  /* Test Memory Address to Register Access Class */ 
  asm volatile( "mov $0xA00DBEEF, %eax\n\t"); 
  asm volatile( "pop %eax\n\t"); 
  printf("value is: 0x%d", *(int*)0xA0009FA8); 
  syscall_sleep(1); 
  /* Test Memory to Register, Memory Pointed by a */ 
  /* Register to Memory, and Memory to Memory Pointed by */ 
  /* a Register Access Classes                    */ 
  memcpy(*(int*)0xA0009FAC, *(int*)0xA0009FA8, 4); 
  /* Test Incrementing/Decrementing Memory Access Class */ 
  *(int*)0xA0009FA8 = *(int*)0xA0009FA8 + 1; 
  *(int*)0xA0009FAC = *(int*)0xA0009FAC + 4; 
  /* Test Pushing/Popping Memory Address Access Class */ 
  val1 = 0xA0009FA8; 
  val2 = 0xA0009FAC; 
  /* Test Memory to Memory Access Class */ 
  memmove(val1, val2, 1); 
    
  syscall_sleep(2); 
  /* Test Accessing Program Counter Address */ 
  asm volatile( "jmp 0xA0009FAC\n\t" ); 
 
#if 1 
  /* Test userspace malloc */ 
  { 
    int *base1, *base2; 
    syscall_lock(); 
    base1 = (int*)malloc(10); 
    syscall_unlock(); 
    printf("pid %d: malloc returns %p\n", pid, base1); 
    syscall_lock(); 
    base2 = (int*)malloc(4096); 
    syscall_unlock(); 
    printf("pid %d: malloc returns %p\n", pid, base2); 
  } 
#endif 
  syscall_sleep(5); 
  return 0; 
} 
J. EXAMPLES/X86/SPROC/ USERMAIN_HELLO.C 
  54 
The ‘examples/x86/sproc/usermain_hello.c’ file contains the code to display the 
resources that are created and tested in the prototype.  
/* 
 * Copyright (c) 2001 The University of Utah and the Flux  
 * Group.  All rights reserved. 
 *  
 * This file is part of the Flux OSKit.  The OSKit is free  
 * software, also known as "open source;" you can  
 * redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the  
 * GNU General Public License (GPL), version 2, as  
 * published by the Free Software Foundation (FSF).  To  
 * explore alternate licensing terms, contact the  
 * University of Utah at csl-dist@cs.utah.edu or +1-801- 
 * 585-3271. 
 * The OSKit is distributed in the hope that it will be  
 * useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the  
 * implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A  
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GPL for more details.  You  
 * should have received a copy of the GPL along with the  
 * OSKit; see the file COPYING.  If not, write to the FSF,  
 * 59 Temple Place #330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. 
 */ 
 
/* Sample user program */ 
 
#include <oskit/c/stdio.h> 
#include "user_syscall.h" 
 
int main() 
{ 
  int value2 = 899; 
  int value = 455;  
  int pid, tid; 
  int i,j; 
  /* obtain process id for displaying */ 
  pid = syscall_getpid(); 
  /* obtain thread id for displaying */ 
  tid = syscall_gettid(); 
  /* don’t run forever for testing */   
  for (i = 0 ; i < 9; i++) { 
    /* display process running results for testing */  
    printf("proc 0x8%x, tid %2d: Hello World, iter = %d ",  
           pid, tid, i); 
    /* waste ticks without pre-emption */ 
    for(j = 0; j < 100000000; j++){} 
    /* display resource values */ 
    printf("address of value is: %x value2 is: %x and value  
         %d value2 %d \n", &value, &value2, value, value2); 
    /* waste ticks with pre-emption */ 
    syscall_sleep(2); 
  } 
  printf("tid %d: Bye!\n", tid); 
  /* tell kernel the process is done */ 
  return 0; 
} 
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K. EXAMPLES/X86/SPROC/KERNEL.C 
The ‘examples/x86/sproc/kernel.c’ file went through the most amount of changes.  
The changes made include reading the configuration file and creating partitions, 
resources, processes, resource flows, and partition flows.  Other changes made involve 
adding a page fault trap handler that follows the rules of the flows to permit or deny 
access attempts made by processes.  
/* 
 * Copyright (c) 2001 The University of Utah and the Flux  
 * Group.  All rights reserved. 
 *  
 * This file is part of the Flux OSKit.  The OSKit is free  
 * software, also known as "open source;" you can  
 * redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the  
 * GNU General Public License (GPL), version 2, as  
 * published by the Free Software Foundation (FSF).  To  
 * explore alternate licensing terms, contact the  
 * University of Utah at csl-dist@cs.utah.edu or +1-801- 
 * 585-3271. 
 * The OSKit is distributed in the hope that it will be  
 * useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the  
 * implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A  
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GPL for more details.  You  
 * should have received a copy of the GPL along with the  
 * OSKit; see the file COPYING.  If not, write to the FSF,  
 * 59 Temple Place #330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. 
 */ 
 
/* 
 * An example for simple process library.  This kernel  
 * loads an ELF binary into a user space and execute it in  
 * user mode.  Several quite simple system calls are     
 * implemented. 
 */ 
/* This file has been modified to add partitioning and  
 * memory resources.  The code in this file makes up the 
 * bulk of the LPSK prototype created from OSKit source 
 */ 
#include <oskit/c/termios.h> 
#include <oskit/c/unistd.h> 
#include <oskit/clientos.h> 
#include <oskit/debug.h> 
#include <oskit/exec/exec.h> 
#include <oskit/gdb.h> 
#include <oskit/machine/pc/phys_lmm.h> 
#include <oskit/sproc.h> 
#include <oskit/startup.h> 
#include <oskit/threads/pthread.h> 
#include <oskit/version.h> 
#include <oskit/x86/proc_reg.h> 
#include <oskit/x86/trap.h> 
#include <oskit/page.h> 
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#include <oskit/c/malloc.h> 
#include <oskit/c/fcntl.h> 
#include <oskit/io/absio.h> 
#include <oskit/x86/pc/pic.h> 
#include <oskit/x86/pc/pit.h> 
#include <oskit/x86/pc/base_irq.h> 
#include <uvm/sproc/sproc_internal.h> 
#include <oskit/x86/eflags.h> 
#include <oskit/lmm.h> 
#include <stdio.h> 
 
#include "proc.h" 
#include "syscallno.h" 
#include "kernel.h" 
#include "config.h" 
/* function to check access by comparing permitted flows 
 * rules with requested access 
 */ 
static int checkAccessFlows(oskit_size_t cr2,  
                            E_ACCESS_MODE access_mode,  
                            int sproc); 
/* structure used to connect the page fault trap handler  
 * in this file to be called when a page fault interrupt 
 * occurs 
 */ 
static struct oskit_sproc_desc process_desc = { 
    NSYS,   /* # of system calls implemented */ 
    my_syscall_tab,  /* system call table */ 
    handler   /* trap handler */ 
}; 
/* configuration file container*/      
struct LPSKconfig *c_file; 
 
/* main of LPSK prototype that reads the configuration file 
 * and from the data gleaned create partitions, processes,  
 * resource flows, resources, and partition flows 
 */ 
extern int 
main() 
{ 
    int i, j; 
    int fd; 
    const char *path = "/configfile"; 
    oskit_off_t offset; 
    oskit_size_t num_bytes; 
    oskit_size_t * out; 
    oskit_absio_t * absio; 
    oskit_error_t error; 
    pthread_attr_t threadattr; 
    struct sched_param param; 
#ifndef KNIT 
 oskit_clientos_init_pthreads(); 
#endif  
/* for GNU debugging and testing purposes */  
#if 0  
    { 
 extern struct termios base_raw_termios,  
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                            base_cooked_termios; 
 printf("setting serial port for gdb\n"); 
 base_raw_termios.c_ispeed = B38400; 
 base_raw_termios.c_ospeed = B38400; 
 base_cooked_termios.c_ispeed = B38400; 
 base_cooked_termios.c_ospeed = B38400; 
 gdb_pc_com_init(1, &base_raw_termios); 
  
 gdb_trap_mask = (1 <<T_PAGE_FAULT) | (1 << T_NO_FPU); 
 printf("break!\n"); 
 gdb_breakpoint(); 
 printf("go!\n"); 
    } 
#endif 
    /* start the clock */ 
    start_clock(); 
    /* instantiate environment for pthreads */ 
    start_pthreads(); 
    start_fs_bmod(); 
 
#if 0 
    { 
 extern int __isthreaded; 
 __isthreaded = 1;  /* for freebsd libc */ 
    } 
#endif 
    /* start up virtual memory system plus swap file */ 
    printf(">> Initializing UVM\n"); 
    oskit_uvm_init(); 
    oskit_uvm_swap_init(); 
    printf(">> Swap On\n"); 
    if (swapon("/swapfile")) { 
 extern int errno; 
 panic("swapon failed (errno %d)\n", errno); 
    } 
    /* read the configuration file from the binary 
     * created and linked into the elf image 
     */ 
    printf(">> Starting to read config file\n");  
    num_bytes = sizeof(struct LPSKconfig); 
     
    fd = open(path, O_RDWR); 
    if (fd == -1) { 
 return -1; 
    } 
    printf(">> Opened file\n"); 
    error = fd_get_absio(fd, &absio); 
    if (error) { 
        printf("errror %i\n", error); 
 return -1; 
    } 
    /* allocate space for configuration file container */ 
    c_file = (struct LPSKconfig *) 
      malloc(sizeof(struct LPSKconfig)); 
    /* read configuration file */ 
    offset = 0; 
    error = oskit_absio_read(absio, c_file,  
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                             offset, num_bytes, out); 
    oskit_absio_release(absio); // don't need anymore  
    if (error) { 
 printf("errror %i\n", error); 
 return -1; 
    } 
    printf("read config file!!!\n"); 
    getchar(); 
    /* start page daemon */ 
    printf(">> Starting the page daemon\n"); 
    oskit_uvm_start_pagedaemon(); 
    /* initialize simple process library */ 
    printf(">> Initializing Simple Process Library\n"); 
    oskit_sproc_init(); 
 
    printf(">> We are ready\n"); 
     
#ifdef  GPROF 
    start_gprof(); 
#endif 
    /* fill structure with pthread attributes */ 
    pthread_attr_init(&threadattr); 
     
    /* Initialize my system calls */ 
    syscall_init(); 
 
    for (j = 0 ; j < NITER ; j++) { 
 pthread_t th[c_file->num_of_processes]; 
 int rc; 
 printf("******  Create processes (%d) ******\n", j); 
 /* create processes */ 
 for (i = 0 ; i < c_file->num_of_processes ; i++) { 
       /* 
        * Create the thread. 
        */ 
       /* set up details for scheduler for process */ 
       param.priority = PRIORITY_NORMAL; 
 
       pthread_attr_setschedparam(&threadattr, &param); 
       pthread_attr_setschedpolicy(&threadattr, SCHED_RR); 
 
   threadattr.sched_ticks =  
   c_file->processList[i].info.sched_ticks; 
   c_file->processList[i].info.attr = &threadattr; 
       /* add temp values for process id for ordering */ 
   c_file->processList[i].info.process_id = i; 
       /* create thread for process */ 
   rc = pthread_create(&th[i], &threadattr,  
  (void *(*)(void*))execute_process, 
  (void *)&c_file->processList[i].info);      
   assert(rc == 0); 
 }  
 /* 
  * Delay for a while, while the threads prove  
  * themselves. 
  */  
 oskit_pthread_sleep(DELAY);  
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 printf("********  Waiting (%d) ********\n", j); 
 for (i = 0 ; i < c_file->num_of_processes ; i++) { 
    pthread_join(th[i], NULL); 
 } 
    } 
    printf("******** Terminated ********\n"); 
    return 0; 
} 
/* this function initializes the virtual memory mappings  
 * for a process and starts processes 
*/ 
static void 
load_process(struct oskit_sproc *sproc,  
             exec_info_t *exec_info, const char *elf, 
             struct oskit_sproc_info *info) 
{ 
    oskit_addr_t heap; 
    oskit_error_t error; 
 
    printf("**** creating a process [%s] (pid %p,  
           thread %d) ****\n", elf, sproc,  
           (int)pthread_self()); 
    /* create a process with the min and max boundaries of 
     * the partition that the process resides 
     */ 
    if (oskit_sproc_create(&process_desc, info->proc_size,  
        info->proc_min_addr, info->proc_max_addr, sproc)) { 
 panic("oskit_sproc_create failed\n"); 
    } 
    error = oskit_sproc_load_elf(sproc, elf, exec_info); 
    if (error) { 
 panic("oskit_sproc_load_elf failed (0x%x)\n", error); 
    } 
    /* map heap area */ 
    //heap = HEAP_START_ADDR; 
    heap = (oskit_size_t)info->proc_heap_start_addr; 
    printf("heap location: %d", heap); 
    /* create mapping for the process with the heap */ 
    error = oskit_uvm_mmap(sproc->sp_vm, &heap, 
      (oskit_size_t)info->proc_heap_size,  
      PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, 
      MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANON|MAP_FIXED, 0, 0); 
    if (error) { 
 panic("oskit_uvm_mmap failed (heap)\n"); 
    } 
    //assert(heap == HEAP_START_ADDR); 
    assert(heap ==  
           (oskit_size_t)info->proc_heap_start_addr); 
    info->sp_vm = sproc->sp_vm; 
} 
 
 
/********************************************************** 
 * 
 * Multiple threads in a Process 
 * 
 *********************************************************/ 
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/* this structure is used to store process information */ 
struct arg { 
    struct oskit_sproc *sproc; 
    oskit_addr_t entry; 
    struct oskit_sproc_info *info; 
}; 
 
/* this function initializes the user stack and page sizes 
 * for a process and then puts the process in user mode 
 * so that the process can begin 
*/ 
static void 
lwp(struct arg *arg) 
{ 
    oskit_addr_t stkaddr; 
    struct oskit_sproc_stack stk; 
    /* pass arguments to process to know where heap  
     * will be located for a process 
     */ 
    oskit_size_t userarg[] = { 
      (oskit_size_t)arg->info->proc_heap_start_addr,  
      (oskit_size_t)arg->info->proc_heap_size, 300}; 
    stkaddr = 0; 
    printf("sproc: %p user heap addr: %x \n", arg->sproc,  
           (oskit_size_t)arg->info->proc_heap_start_addr); 
    /* create the user process’ stack */ 
    if (oskit_sproc_stack_alloc(arg->sproc, &stkaddr,  
        USER_STACK_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE, &stk)) { 
 panic("oskit_sproc_alloc_stack failed\n"); 
    } 
    /* push the arguments for the process on it’s stack */ 
    if (oskit_sproc_stack_push(&stk, &userarg,  
        sizeof(userarg))) { 
 panic("oskit_sproc_alloc_push failed\n"); 
    } 
 
    printf("thread %d: process %p, user stack [%x..%x]\n",  
           (int)pthread_self(), arg->sproc,  
           stkaddr + PAGE_SIZE,  
           stkaddr + USER_STACK_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE); 
    /* switch to user-domain */ 
    oskit_sproc_switch(arg->sproc, arg->entry, &stk); 
} 
 
/* this function creates a process by initializing the 
 * configuration file structure to have the new process  
 * id’s of the newly created process instead of  
 * the placeholder id’s from configuration file  
 */ 
static void  
execute_process(void *arg) 
{ 
    struct oskit_sproc sproc; 
    exec_info_t exec_info; 
    int i, k, l; 
    int process_id; 
    const char *filename =  
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    (const char*)(((struct oskit_sproc_info *)(arg))->arg); 
    pthread_t th[NTHREAD]; 
     
    printf("filename: %s \n", filename); 
    load_process(&sproc, &exec_info, filename, arg); 
    /* obtain the process id for the new process */ 
    process_id = (int)&sproc; 
    printf("main proc 0x8%x!!!!!!!!\n", process_id); 
    /* overwrite old process id placeholders in the  
     * configuration file structure 
     */ 
    i = ((struct oskit_sproc_info *)arg)->process_id; 
    for(k = 0; k< c_file->num_of_partitions; k++){ 
      for(l = 0; l< c_file->num_of_processes; l++){ 
        if(c_file->processList[i].process_id ==  
           c_file->partitionList[k].process_ids[l]){    
             c_file->partitionList[k].process_ids[l] =  
             process_id; 
        }   
      } 
    } 
    for(k = 0; k< c_file->num_of_res_flows; k++){ 
      if(c_file->processList[i].process_id ==  
         c_file->resFlows[k].process_id){ 
        c_file->resFlows[k].process_id = process_id; 
      } 
    } 
    c_file->processList[i].process_id = process_id; 
     
    /* create the processes and let them go, killing them 
     * when and if they return 
     */ 
    for (i = 0 ; i < NTHREAD ; i++) { 
 struct arg arg2; 
 arg2.sproc = &sproc; 
 arg2.entry = exec_info.entry; 
 arg2.info = arg; 
  
 pthread_create(&th[i],  
                  ((struct oskit_sproc_info *)(arg))->attr,  
         (void*(*)(void*))lwp, &arg2); 
    } 
    for (i = 0 ; i < NTHREAD ; i++) { 
 pthread_join(th[i], NULL); 
    } 
 
    printf("**** destroying process (thread %d) ****\n",  
           (int)pthread_self()); 
    oskit_sproc_destroy(&sproc); 
} 
 
/* this function checks the resource flows and partition 
 * flows from the configuration data to determine if the 
 * given process can have the petitioned access 
*/ 
static int checkAccessFlows(oskit_size_t cr2,  
                             E_ACCESS_MODE access_mode, 
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                    int sproc){ 
  int i, j, process_id;  
  int partition_from_id = 0; 
  int partition_to_id = 0; 
  int resource_id = 0; 
  int grant_access = 0; 
   
  process_id = sproc;  
  /* obtain partition where process resides */ 
  printf("check access proc 0x8%x !!!!!!!!\n",process_id);  
  for(i=0;i<c_file->num_of_partitions;i++){ 
    for(j=0;j<c_file->num_of_processes;j++){ 
      if(c_file->partitionList[i].process_ids[j] ==  
         process_id){ 
        partition_from_id =  
        c_file->partitionList[i].partition_id; 
        break; 
      } 
    } 
  } 
  /* obtain partition where access is attempted */ 
  for(i=0;i<c_file->num_of_partitions;i++){ 
    if((cr2 >=  
      (oskit_size_t)c_file->partitionList[i].part_min_addr)  
      && (cr2 <=  
       (oskit_size_t)c_file->partitionList[i].part_min_addr  
      + (oskit_size_t)c_file->partitionList[i].part_size)){ 
      partition_to_id =  
      c_file->partitionList[i].partition_id; 
    } 
  }    
  //if no partition exists for read/write and from where,  
  //terminate 
  //the check on where, which is a sanity check 
  if((!partition_from_id) || (!partition_to_id)) return -1; 
   
  //First Check to see if there is a partition Flow to  
  //allow the access 
  for(i=0;i<c_file->num_of_part_flows;i++){ 
    if((c_file->partFlows[i].partition_id_from ==  
        partition_from_id) && 
        (c_file->partFlows[i].partition_id_to ==  
         partition_to_id) && 
       (((c_file->partFlows[i].access_mode) ==  
       access_mode) || 
  ((c_file->partFlows[i].access_mode) >=  
        access_mode+2))){ 
      grant_access = 1; 
    }  
  } 
  if(!grant_access) return -1; 
   
  //Next Check to see if there is a resource Flow to allow  
  //the access 
  //to this process 
   
  for(i=0;i<c_file->num_of_resources;i++){ 
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    if((cr2 >=  
       (oskit_size_t)c_file->resourceList[i].res_min_addr)  
       && (cr2 <=  
       (oskit_size_t)c_file->resourceList[i].res_min_addr +  
       (oskit_size_t)c_file->resourceList[i].res_size)){ 
      resource_id = c_file->resourceList[i].resource_id; 
    } 
  }    
   
  //if no resource exists for read/write, terminate 
  if(!resource_id) return -1; 
   
  for(i=0;i<c_file->num_of_res_flows;i++){ 
    if((c_file->resFlows[i].process_id == process_id) && 
       (c_file->resFlows[i].resource_id == resource_id) && 
       (((c_file->resFlows[i].access_mode) == access_mode)  
       || ((c_file->resFlows[i].access_mode) >=  
           access_mode+2))){ 
      return 1; //Permission granted 
    }  
  } 
  return -1; //Access denied 
} 
 
/* this function identifies a process that resides 
 * in the attempted access location 
*/ 
static int getVMSpace(oskit_size_t cr2){ 
  int i; 
  for(i=0;i<c_file->num_of_processes;i++){ 
    printf("cr2: 0x%x >= min 0x%x cr2: 0x%x <=  
           max 0x%x \n", cr2,  
   (oskit_size_t)c_file->processList[i].info.proc_min_addr,  
    cr2,  
  (oskit_size_t)c_file->processList[i].info.proc_max_addr); 
     
    if((cr2 >=  
   (oskit_size_t)c_file->processList[i].info.proc_min_addr)  
    && (cr2 <=  
 (oskit_size_t)c_file->processList[i].info.proc_max_addr)){ 
      printf("going to swap vmspace\n"); 
      return i; 
    } 
  } 
  return -1; 
} 
 
/* 
 *  Trap handler for the simple process library 
 *  This trap handler is implemented to be a page fault 
 *  trap handler to catch the various memory access  
 *  attempts 
 */ 
static int 
handler(struct oskit_sproc_thread *sthread, int signo,  
int code, struct trap_state *ts) 
{ 
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    oskit_size_t cr2 = get_cr2(); 
    int i;  
    int from_user = (ts->cs & 3) || (ts->eflags & EFL_VM); 
    struct oskit_vmspace *processesVM; 
    long mem, val; 
    unsigned char data[ts->ecx]; 
    E_ACCESS_MODE access_mode; 
     
    printf("handler proc 0x8%x !!!!!!!!\n", 
           (int)sthread->st_process);  
    printf("eip address: %x \n", ts->eip); 
    printf("esp address: %x \n", ts->esp); 
    printf("cr2 address: %x \n", cr2); 
    /* Is this a program counter access attempt? 
     * kill the process if it is 
     */ 
    if(ts->eip == cr2){ 
      printf("execute read or write so kill process!"); 
      return 1;//Don't allow execute! so kill process 
    } 
    /* Is this a nested trap or double fault?  
     * kill the process as to not allow if it is 
     */ 
    if(!from_user){ 
      printf("kernel\n");  
      return 1; //Don't allow trap nesting or double  
                //faults! So kill process 
    } 
     
    printf("ERR!: thread = %d, process = %p, signo = %d, " 
    "code = %d, frame = %p\n", (int)pthread_self(),  
         sthread->st_process, signo, code, ts); 
    printf("page fault address 0x%x\n", cr2); 
    /* if page fault from accessing kernel memory  
     * kill process because this should never happen  
     */ 
    /* sanity check */ 
    if(cr2 < OSKIT_UVM_MINUSER_ADDRESS) return 1;   
    /* check if partition exists, if not kill process */ 
    if((i = getVMSpace(cr2)) == -1) return 1;    
    /* get mapping from other process to use */    
    processesVM = c_file->processList[i].info.sp_vm; 
    printf("opcode: %x \n", *(unsigned short*)ts->eip); 
    switch(*(unsigned short*)(ts->eip)){  
      case(0x05FF): //incl addr  
     /* define access mode of this opcode */ 
     access_mode = W; 
     /* grab memory address accessed */ 
     mem = *(long*)(ts->eip+2); 
     printf("0x05FF!\n"); 
     /* make sure the address access is the fault  
      * address 
      */ 
     if(mem != cr2) return 1; //sanity check 
     //check access and kill if denied 
     if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
        (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1; 
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      //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
     processesVM = oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* perform operation of instruction attempted by  
      * user since it has enough permissions 
      */ 
     *(int*)mem = *(int*)mem + 1; 
     /* swap in old mapping */ 
     oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* set user to return after instruction since 
      * we have already executed the instruction 
      */ 
     ts->eip = ts->eip+6; 
     return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
      case(0x0583): //addl const,addr  
     /* define access mode of this opcode */ 
     access_mode = W; 
     /* grab memory address accessed */ 
     mem = *(long*)(ts->eip+2); 
     val = *(unsigned char*)(ts->eip+6); 
     printf("0x0583!\n"); 
     if(mem != cr2) return 1; //sanity check 
     //check access and kill if denied 
     if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
        (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
     //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
     processesVM = oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* perform operation of instruction attempted by  
      * user since it has enough permissions 
      */ 
     *(int*)mem = *(int*)mem + val; 
     /* swap in old mapping */ 
     oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* set user to return after instruction since 
      * we have already executed the instruction 
      */ 
     ts->eip = ts->eip+7; 
     return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
      case(0x35FF): //pushl addr  
     /* define access mode of this opcode */ 
     access_mode = R; 
     /* grab memory address accessed */ 
     mem = *(long*)(ts->eip+2); 
     //val = *(unsigned char*)(ts->eip+6); 
     printf("0x058F!\n"); 
     if(mem != cr2) return 1; //sanity check 
     //check access and kill if denied 
     if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode, 
        (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
     /* increase user stack since 
      * we need to execute the instruction 
      */ 
     ts->esp = ts->esp - 4; 
     //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
     processesVM = oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* perform operation of instruction attempted by  
      * user since it has enough permissions 
      */ 
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     val = *(long*)mem; 
     /* swap in old mapping */ 
     oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     *(long*)(ts->esp) = val;  
     /* set user to return after instruction since 
      * we have already executed the instruction 
      */ 
     ts->eip = ts->eip+6; 
     return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
      case(0x058F): //popl addr  
     /* define access mode of this opcode */ 
     access_mode = W; 
     /* grab memory address accessed */ 
     mem = *(long*)(ts->eip+2); 
     val = *(long*)(ts->esp); 
     printf("0x058F!\n"); 
     if(mem != cr2) return 1; //sanity check 
     //check access and kill if denied 
     if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
        (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
     //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
     processesVM = oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* perform operation of instruction attempted by  
      * user since it has enough permissions 
      */ 
     *(long*)mem = val; 
     /* swap in old mapping */ 
     oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* decrease user stack since 
      * we have already executed the instruction 
      */ 
     ts->esp = ts->esp + 4; 
     /* set user to return after instruction since 
      * we have already executed the instruction 
      */ 
     ts->eip = ts->eip+6; 
     return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
      case(0x05c7): //movl const, addr 
     /* define access mode of this opcode */ 
     access_mode = W; 
     /* grab memory address accessed */ 
     mem = *(long*)(ts->eip+2); 
     val = *(long*)(ts->eip+6); 
     printf("0x05c7!\n"); 
     if(mem != cr2) return 1; //sanity check 
     //check access and kill if denied 
     if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
        (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
     //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
     processesVM = oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* perform operation of instruction attempted by  
      * user since it has enough permissions 
      */ 
     //*(int*)mem = val; 
     asm volatile( 
    "pushl %%eax\n\t" 
    "pushl %%ebx\n\t" 
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    "pushl %1\n\t" 
    "pushl %0\n\t" 
    "popl %%eax\n\t" 
    "popl %%ebx\n\t" 
        "movl %%eax, (%%ebx)\n\t" 
    "popl %%ebx\n\t" 
    "popl %%eax\n\t" 
    : "=m" ((long)val) 
    : "m" ((oskit_size_t)mem) 
    ); 
     /* swap in old mapping */ 
     oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* set user to return after instruction since 
      * we have already executed the instruction 
      */ 
     ts->eip = ts->eip+10; 
     return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
      case(0x008b): //mov (%eax),%eax  
     /* define access mode of this opcode */ 
     access_mode = R; 
     /* grab memory address accessed */ 
     mem = ts->eax; 
     printf("0x008b!\n"); 
     if(mem != cr2) return 1; //sanity check 
     //check access and kill if denied 
     if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
        (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
     //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
     processesVM = oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* perform operation of instruction attempted by  
      * user since it has enough permissions 
      */ 
     ts->eax = *(int*)mem; 
     /* swap in old mapping */ 
     oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* set user to return after instruction since 
      * we have already executed the instruction 
      */ 
     ts->eip = ts->eip+2; 
     return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
      case(0x0289): //mov %eax,(%edx) 
     /* define access mode of this opcode */ 
     access_mode = W; 
     /* grab memory address accessed */ 
     mem = ts->edx; 
     val = ts->eax; 
     printf("0x0289!\n"); 
     if(mem != cr2) return 1; //sanity check 
     //check access and kill if denied 
     if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
        (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
     //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
     processesVM = oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* perform operation of instruction attempted by  
      * user since it has enough permissions 
      */ 
     *(int*)mem = val; 
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     /* swap in old mapping */ 
     oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* set user to return after instruction since 
      * we have already executed the instruction 
      */ 
     ts->eip = ts->eip+2; 
     return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
      case(0x158b): //mov addr, %edx 
     /* define access mode of this opcode */ 
     access_mode = N; 
     /* grab memory address accessed */ 
     mem = *(long*)(ts->eip+2); 
     printf("0x158b!\n"); 
     if(mem != cr2) return 1; //sanity check 
     //check access and kill if denied 
     if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
        (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
     //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
     processesVM = oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* perform operation of instruction attempted by  
      * user since it has enough permissions 
      */ 
     ts->edx = mem; 
     /* swap in old mapping */ 
     oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* set user to return after instruction since 
      * we have already executed the instruction 
      */ 
     ts->eip = ts->eip+6; 
     return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
      case(0xa4f3): //repz movsb %ds:(%esi), %es:(%edi) 
     //based on ecx count 
     /* define access mode of the first half opcode */ 
     access_mode = R; 
     printf("esi address: %x \n", ts->esi); 
     printf("edi address: %x \n", ts->edi); 
     /* grab memory address accessed */ 
     mem = ts->esi; 
     printf("0xa4f3!\n"); 
     if(mem != cr2) return 1; //sanity check 
     //check access and kill if denied 
     if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
        (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
     //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
     processesVM = oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* perform operation of instruction attempted by  
      * user since it has enough permissions 
      */ 
     for(i=0;i<(int)ts->ecx;i++) 
       data[i] = (unsigned char)*(((long*)ts->esi)+i); 
     /* swap in old mapping */ 
     oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     //from and to addresses may reside in separate  
     //partitions 
     //so we must set vmspace again 
     //if no partition found, kill process    
     if((i = getVMSpace(ts->edi)) == -1) return 1;  
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     //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
     processesVM = c_file->processList[i].info.sp_vm; 
     /* define access mode of this half of opcode */ 
     access_mode = W; 
     //check access and kill if denied 
     if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
        (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
     //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
     processesVM = oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* perform operation of instruction attempted by  
      * user since it has enough permissions 
      */ 
     for(i=0;i<(int)ts->ecx;i++) 
       *(((long*)ts->edi)+i) = data[i]; 
     /* swap in old mapping */ 
     oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
     /* set user to return after instruction since 
      * we have already executed the instruction 
      */ 
     ts->eip = ts->eip+2; 
     return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
      default:  
 switch(*(unsigned char*)(ts->eip)){ 
          case(0x58): //pop addr value into eax register                 
            //this will not occur 
            /* define access mode of this opcode */ 
            access_mode = N; 
            printf("0x58!\n"); 
            //check access and kill if denied 
            if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
               (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
            //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
            processesVM =  
            oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
            /* perform operation of instruction attempted 
            * by user since it has enough permissions 
            */ 
            ts->eax = cr2; 
            /* swap in old mapping */ 
            oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
            /* set user to return after instruction since 
            * we have already executed the instruction 
            */ 
            ts->eip = ts->eip+1; 
            return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
          case(0x68): //push addr code will not cause trap  
            //so this will never happen 
            /* define access mode of this opcode */ 
            access_mode = N; 
            /* grab memory address accessed */ 
            mem = *(long*)(ts->eip+1); 
            val = 0;//ts->eax; 
            printf("0x68!\n"); 
            if(mem != cr2) return 1; //sanity check 
            //check access and kill if denied 
            if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
               (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
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            //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
            processesVM =  
            oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
            /* perform operation of instruction attempted 
            * by user since it has enough permissions 
            */ 
            //ts->eax = mem; 
            asm volatile( 
    "pushl %1\n\t" 
    : "=m" (val) 
    : "m" (mem) 
    ); 
            /* swap in old mapping */ 
            oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
            /* set user to return after instruction since 
            * we have already executed the instruction 
            */ 
            ts->eip = ts->eip+5; 
            return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
          case(0xa1): //mov addr, %eax 
            /* define access mode of this opcode */ 
            access_mode = N; 
            /* grab memory address accessed */ 
            mem = *(long*)(ts->eip+1); 
            val = 0;//ts->eax; 
            printf("0xa1!\n"); 
            if(mem != cr2) return 1; //sanity check 
            //check access and kill if denied 
            if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
               (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
            //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
            processesVM =  
            /* swap in old mapping */ 
            oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
            /* perform operation of instruction attempted 
            * by user since it has enough permissions 
            */ 
            //ts->eax = mem; 
            asm volatile( 
    "pushl %%ebx\n\t" 
    "pushl %1\n\t" 
    "popl %%ebx\n\t" 
        "mov %%ebx, %0\n\t" 
    "popl %%ebx\n\t" 
    : "=m" (val) 
    : "m" (mem) 
    ); 
            oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
            ts->eax = val; 
            /* set user to return after instruction since 
            * we have already executed the instruction 
            */ 
            ts->eip = ts->eip+5; 
            return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
          case(0xa3): //mov %eax, addr 
            /* define access mode of this opcode */ 
            access_mode = R; 
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            /* grab memory address accessed */ 
            mem = *(long*)(ts->eip+1); 
            val = ts->eax; 
            printf("0xa3!\n"); 
            if(mem != cr2) return 1; //sanity check 
            //check access and kill if denied 
            if((i = checkAccessFlows(cr2, access_mode,  
               (int)sthread->st_process)) == -1) return 1;  
            //swap in memory mapping to access memory 
            processesVM =  
            oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
            /* perform operation of instruction attempted 
            * by user since it has enough permissions 
            */ 
            //*(int*)mem = ts->eax; 
            asm volatile( 
    "pushl %%eax\n\t" 
    "pushl %%ebx\n\t" 
    "pushl %1\n\t" 
    "pushl %0\n\t" 
    "popl %%ebx\n\t" 
    "popl %%eax\n\t" 
        "mov %%ebx, (%%eax)\n\t" 
    "popl %%ebx\n\t" 
    "popl %%eax\n\t" 
    : "=m" (val) 
    : "m" ((oskit_size_t)mem) 
    ); 
            /* swap in old mapping */ 
            oskit_uvm_vmspace_set(processesVM); 
            /* set user to return after instruction since 
            * we have already executed the instruction 
            */ 
            ts->eip = ts->eip+5; 
            return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
          default: printf("not found!\n"); 
            return 1; //not found so kill process  
        }      
    }      
    return 0; //handled trap so return to process 
} 
 
/* 
 *  For debugging 
 */ 
void 
dump_kvmspace() 
{ 
    oskit_uvm_vmspace_dump(&oskit_uvm_kvmspace); 
} 
L. EXAMPLES/X86/SPROC/USER_CRT.C 
The ‘examples/x86/sproc/user_crt.c’ file was modified to permit heap allocation 
within partitions that the user process resides.  
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/* 
 * Copyright (c) 2001 The University of Utah and the Flux  
 * Group.  All rights reserved. 
 *  
 * This file is part of the Flux OSKit.  The OSKit is free  
 * software, also known as "open source;" you can  
 * redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the  
 * GNU General Public License (GPL), version 2, as  
 * published by the Free Software Foundation (FSF).  To  
 * explore alternate licensing terms, contact the  
 * University of Utah at csl-dist@cs.utah.edu or +1-801- 
 * 585-3271. 
 * The OSKit is distributed in the hope that it will be  
 * useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the  
 * implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A  
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GPL for more details.  You  
 * should have received a copy of the GPL along with the  
 * OSKit; see the file COPYING.  If not, write to the FSF,  
 * 59 Temple Place #330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. 
 */ 
 
/* 
 * C run time for user mode process. 
 * Initialize minimal C library, allocate malloc arena,  
 * etc. 
 */ 
 
#include <oskit/c/stdio.h> 
#include <oskit/com/mem.h> 
#include <oskit/lmm.h> 
#include <oskit/c/malloc.h> 
#include <oskit/c/environment.h> /* libc_memory_object */ 
#include <oskit/c/unistd.h> /* exit */ 
#include <oskit/uvm.h> 
 
#include "proc.h" 
#include "user_syscall.h" 
 
lmm_t malloc_lmm = LMM_INITIALIZER; 
struct lmm_region region; 
 
extern void syscall_return(int code); 
extern int main(int argc, char **argv); 
/* pass paramaters to user processes for heap allocation  
 * within their partition 
 */ 
extern int 
_start(int arg1, int arg2, int arg3) 
{ 
    oskit_mem_t *memi; 
    static volatile int initstate = 0; 
 
    /* Poor lock */ 
    syscall_lock(); 
    if (initstate == 0) { 
 
 memi = oskit_mem_init(); 
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 printf("Start user process\n"); 
 /* Print the arguments received from the kernel */ 
 printf("arg1 = %x, arg2 = %x, arg3 = %x\n", arg1,  
             arg2, arg3); 
  
 /* Initialize LMM for userspace malloc heap */ 
      /* added heap allocation based on partition space */ 
 lmm_add_region(&malloc_lmm, &region, (void*)arg1, 
            arg2, 0, 0); //DWC 4/6/2007 
 lmm_add_free(&malloc_lmm, (void*)arg1,  
                   arg2); //DWC 4/6/2007 
  
 libc_memory_object = memi; 
 
 /* set exit hook */ 
 oskit_libc_exit = syscall_return; 
 initstate = 1; 
    } 
    syscall_unlock(); 
 
    /* XXX: please someone add argc and argv! */ 
    exit(main(0, NULL)); 
} 
M. EXAMPLES/X86/SPROC/CONFIGAPP.C 
The ‘examples/x86/sproc/configapp.c’ file contains the code of the configapp 
application that creates configuration files in binary form.  
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <fcntl.h> 
#include "config.h" 
 
/* configuration file structure used by LPSK prototype */ 
static struct LPSKconfig *c_file;  
 
int main(){ 
  /* allocate space for the config file structure */  
  c_file = (struct LPSKconfig *) malloc(sizeof(struct  
            LPSKconfig)); 
  /* set unique configuration file id */ 
  c_file->id = 100; 
  /* set policy name */   
  strncpy(c_file->policy,"policy1", 7); 
  /* set version number */ 
  c_file->version = 1; 
  /* set number of partitions */ 
  c_file->num_of_partitions = 2; 
  /* set number of resources */ 
  c_file->num_of_resources = 2; 
  /* set number of processes */ 
  c_file->num_of_processes = 2; 
  /* set number of partition flows */ 
  c_file->num_of_part_flows = 1; 
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  /* set number of resource flows */ 
  c_file->num_of_res_flows = 2; 
  /* set timeSlices used for scheduling for partitions */ 
  c_file->partitionList[0].timeSlice = 1; 
  c_file->partitionList[1].timeSlice = 1; 
  /* set process id’s for the processes */ 
  c_file->processList[0].process_id = 153; 
  c_file->processList[1].process_id = 253; 
  /* set priorities used for scheduling the processes */ 
  c_file->processList[0].priority = 1; 
  c_file->processList[1].priority = 1; 
  /* set partition memory locations and their sizes*/ 
  c_file->partitionList[0].part_min_addr = 0x90000000; 
  c_file->partitionList[0].part_size = 0x5000000; 
  c_file->partitionList[1].part_min_addr = 0xA0000000; 
  c_file->partitionList[1].part_size = 0x10000000; 
  /* set unique resource id’s for each resource */ 
  c_file->resourceList[0].resource_id = 12345; 
  c_file->resourceList[1].resource_id = 6785; 
  /* set resource memory locations and their sizes*/ 
  c_file->resourceList[0].res_min_addr = 0xA0009FA8; 
  c_file->resourceList[0].res_size = 0x4; 
  c_file->resourceList[1].res_min_addr = 0xA0009FAC; 
  c_file->resourceList[1].res_size = 0x4; 
  /* pass unique resource id’s to partitions */ 
  c_file->partitionList[1].resource_ids[0] = 12345; 
  c_file->partitionList[1].resource_ids[1] = 6785; 
  /* pass unique process id’s to partitions */ 
  c_file->partitionList[0].process_ids[0] = 153; 
  c_file->partitionList[1].process_ids[0] = 253; 
  /* set unique partition id’s for each partition */ 
  c_file->partitionList[0].partition_id = 89354; 
  c_file->partitionList[1].partition_id = 90876; 
  /* pass unique partition id’s to partition flows */ 
  c_file->partFlows[0].partition_id_from = 89354; 
  c_file->partFlows[0].partition_id_to = 90876;  
  /* set the access mode for partition flow */ 
  c_file->partFlows[0].access_mode = RW; 
  /* pass unique resource id’s to resource flows */ 
  c_file->resFlows[0].resource_id = 12345; 
  c_file->resFlows[1].resource_id = 6785; 
  /* define the process that has access to the resource 
   * flows  
   */ 
  c_file->resFlows[0].process_id = 153; 
  c_file->resFlows[1].process_id = 153;  
  /* set the access modes for the resource flows */ 
  c_file->resFlows[0].access_mode = RW; 
  c_file->resFlows[1].access_mode = RW; 
  /* set the name of the file with main of the process */   
  strncpy(c_file->processList[0].info.arg,  
         "/usermain_testsproc", 19); 
  /* set partition constraints to the process mapping  
   * defines and scheduling ticks of the process  
   */ 
  c_file->processList[0].info.proc_size = 0x5000000; 
  c_file->processList[0].info.proc_min_addr = 0x90000000; 
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  c_file->processList[0].info.proc_max_addr = 0x95000000; 
  c_file->processList[0].info.proc_heap_start_addr =  
    0x92500000; 
  c_file->processList[0].info.proc_heap_size = 0x10000; 
  c_file->processList[0].info.sched_ticks = 1; 
  /* set the name of the file with main of the process */   
  strncpy(c_file->processList[1].info.arg,  
         "/usermain_hello", 15); 
  /* set partition constraints to the process mapping  
   * defines and scheduling ticks of the process  
   */ 
  c_file->processList[1].info.proc_size = 0x10000000; 
  c_file->processList[1].info.proc_min_addr = 0xA0000000; 
  c_file->processList[1].info.proc_max_addr = 0xB0000000; 
  c_file->processList[1].info.proc_heap_start_addr =  
    0xA7500000; 
  c_file->processList[1].info.proc_heap_size = 0x10000; 
  c_file->processList[1].info.sched_ticks = 1; 
  /* write the config data to the configuration file */ 
  writeData(c_file, "configfile"); 
  return 0; 
} 
 
/* Writing */ 
/* This function writes the LPSKconfig structure to file */ 
int writeData( struct LPSKconfig* data, const char * file) 
{ 
   int fd = 0; 
   FILE *f; 
   /* open the file for writing */ 
   f = fopen(file, "w"); 
   /* write the binary structure right to the file */ 
   fwrite(data,sizeof(struct LPSKconfig),1,f); 
   /* close the file */ 
   fclose(f); 
 
   return 0; 
} 
 
N. EXAMPLES/X86/SPROC/GNUMAKERULES 
The ‘examples/x86/sproc/gnumakerules’ was modified to allow processes to run 
in their specific partition and to read the configuration file for the LPSK prototype.  
/* 
 * Copyright (c) 2001 The University of Utah and the Flux  
 * Group.  All rights reserved. 
 *  
 * This file is part of the Flux OSKit.  The OSKit is free  
 * software, also known as "open source;" you can  
 * redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the  
 * GNU General Public License (GPL), version 2, as  
 * published by the Free Software Foundation (FSF).  To  
 * explore alternate licensing terms, contact the  
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 * University of Utah at csl-dist@cs.utah.edu or +1-801- 
 * 585-3271. 
 * The OSKit is distributed in the hope that it will be  
 * useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the  
 * implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A  
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GPL for more details.  You  
 * should have received a copy of the GPL along with the  
 * OSKit; see the file COPYING.  If not, write to the FSF,  
 * 59 Temple Place #330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. 
 */ 
 
ifndef _oskit_examples_x86_sproc_makerules_ 
_oskit_examples_x86_sproc_makerules__ = yes 
 
USER_PROGS = usermain_testsproc usermain_hello  
             usermain_malloc 
# added configfile as a bmod to link in configuration file 
BMODS = kernel swapfile configfile $(USER_PROGS)  
TARGETS = Image 
 
all: $(TARGETS) 
 
SRCDIRS += $(OSKIT_SRCDIR)/examples/x86/sproc 
 
INCDIRS += $(OSKIT_SRCDIR)/oskit/c 
 
CLEAN_FILES += $(TARGETS) $(BMODS) *.gdb 
OSKIT_CFLAGS += -DOSKIT 
 
# 
# The C library is made up of several pieces. The core  
# library, the POSIX interface that converts syscalls to  
# COM, and the actual COM interfaces. Note that the C  
# library is built with the COM library. 
CLIB   = -loskit_c 
#CLIB_P = -loskit_c_p -loskit_gprof -loskit_c_p - 
#loskit_kern_p 
 
include $(OSKIT_SRCDIR)/GNUmakerules 
 
DEPENDLIBS = $(filter %.a,  
       $(foreach DIR,$(LIBDIRS),$(wildcard $(DIR)/*))) 
 
THRDLIBS   = -loskit_threads -loskit_netbsd_uvm  
THRDLIBS_P   = -loskit_threads_p -loskit_netbsd_uvm_p 
CLIB   = -loskit_freebsd_c_r -loskit_com -loskit_threads 
CLIB_P = -loskit_freebsd_c_r_p -loskit_com_p \ 
         -loskit_threads_p -loskit_gprof \ 
     -loskit_freebsd_c_r_p -loskit_kern_p 
 
kernel: $(OBJDIR)/lib/multiboot.o kernel.o kern_syscall.o  
     $(DEPENDLIBS) 
 $(OSKIT_QUIET_MAKE_INFORM) "Linking example $@" 
 $(LD) -Ttext 100000 $(LDFLAGS) $(OSKIT_LDFLAGS) \ 
  -o $@ $(filter-out %.a,$^)  \ 
  -loskit_startup -loskit_fsnamespace \ 
  -loskit_memfs -loskit_sproc \ 
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  -loskit_netbsd_uvm -loskit_exec -loskit_memfs \ 
  $(THRDLIBS) -loskit_clientos \ 
  -loskit_dev -loskit_kern -loskit_lmm \ 
  $(CLIB) $(OBJDIR)/lib/crtn.o 
 
kernel_p.gdb: $(OBJDIR)/lib/multiboot.o kernel.po  
      kern_syscall.po $(DEPENDLIBS) 
 $(OSKIT_QUIET_MAKE_INFORM) "Linking example $@" 
 $(LD) -Ttext 100000 $(LDFLAGS) $(OSKIT_LDFLAGS) \ 
  -o $@ $(filter-out %.a,$^)  \ 
  -loskit_startup_p -loskit_fsnamespace_p \ 
  -loskit_memfs_p -loskit_sproc_p \ 
  -loskit_netbsd_uvm_p -loskit_exec_p \ 
           -loskit_memfs_p \ 
  $(THRDLIBS_P) -loskit_clientos_p \ 
  -loskit_realtime_p -loskit_kern_p -loskit_lmm_p\ 
  $(CLIB_P) \ 
  $(OBJDIR)/lib/crtn.o 
 
kernel_p: kernel_p.gdb 
 cp kernel_p.gdb kernel_p 
 strip kernel_p 
 
# 
# Build user mode programs 
#  
USER_CRT  = user_crt.o 
USER_OBJS = user_syscall.o user_mem.o user_morecore.o 
# added 90000000 to have this process be in a partition 
usermain_testsproc: $(USER_CRT) usermain_testsproc.o  
  $(USER_OBJS) \ 
  $(CC) -nostdlib -static \ 
  $(USER_CRT) usermain_testsproc.o \ 
  $(USER_OBJS) \ 
  -o $@ -Xlinker -Ttext -Xlinker 90000000 \ 
  -L../../../lib -loskit_c -loskit_lmm 
# added A0000000 to have this process be in a partition 
usermain_hello: $(USER_CRT) usermain_hello.o $(USER_OBJS) \ 
 $(CC) -nostdlib -static \ 
      $(USER_CRT) usermain_hello.o $(USER_OBJS) \ 
  -o $@ -Xlinker -Ttext -Xlinker A0000000 \ 
  -L../../../lib -loskit_c -loskit_lmm 
# added 50000000 to have this process be in a partition 
usermain_malloc: $(USER_CRT) usermain_malloc.o $(USER_OBJS)  
 $(CC) -nostdlib -static $(USER_CRT) usermain_malloc.o  
 $(USER_OBJS) \ 
  -o $@ -Xlinker -Ttext -Xlinker 50000000 \ 
  -L../../../lib -loskit_c -loskit_lmm 
 
# 
# Small swapfile (1MB) 
# 
swapfile: 
 dd if=/dev/zero of=$@ count=2048 
 
# 
# Bind all together! 
  78 
# 
Image: $(BMODS) 
 echo "use 'mkmb2 $(BMODS)' to build the bmod" 
 
Image_p: kernel_p kernel_p.gdb swapfile $(USER_PROGS) 
 echo "use 'mkmb2 -o $@ kernel_p kernel_p.gdb:a.out  
     swapfile configfile $(USER_PROGS)' to build a bmod" 
 
endif 
O. DISSASSEMBLY OF TESTSPROC.C 
The ‘dump’ file of testpsroc.c was created using GNU objdump.  The machine 
code and the assembly are listed with comments to understand which assembly tested 
which memory access class test.  The code has comments of which test was run by the 
assembly instruction and follow the naming convention used in Appendix B.  The 
opcodes mentioned in Appendix B are listed here as machine code and are either the first 
byte or first two bytes listed on each line. 
4c: ff 35 a8 9f 00 a0     pushl 0xa0009fa8     //Test AC10 
52: 8f 05 ac 9f 00 a0     popl 0xa0009fac       //Test AC11 
58: b8 12 00 00 00        mov $0x12,%eax 
5d: a3 a8 9f 00 a0        mov %eax,0xa0009fa8  //Test AC9 
62: c7 05 a8 9f 00 a0 64  movl $0x64,0xa0009fa8//Test AC1 
69: 00 00 00  
6c: 50                    push %eax 
6d: 68 ef be 00 a0        push $0xa000beef     //Test AC6 
72: 58                    pop %eax//Test AC6 
73: b8 ef be 0d a0        mov $0xa00dbeef,%eax //Test AC2 
78: 58                    pop %eax 
79: 58                    pop %eax 
7a: 5a                    pop %edx 
7b: 6a 64                 push $0x64 
7d: 68 4f 00 00 00        push $0x4f 
82: e8 fc ff ff ff        call 83 <main+0x83> 
87: c7 04 24 01 00 00 00  movl $0x1,(%esp,1) 
8e: e8 fc ff ff ff        call 8f <main+0x8f> 
93: a1 a8 9f 00 a0        mov 0xa0009fa8,%eax  //Test AC8 
98: 8b 15 ac 9f 00 a0     mov 0xa0009fac,%edx  //Test AC8 
9e: 8b 00                 mov (%eax),%eax  //Test AC3 
a0: 89 02                 mov %eax,(%edx)   //Test AC4 
a2: 83 c4 0c              add $0xc,%esp 
a5: ff 05 a8 9f 00 a0     incl 0xa0009fa8  //Test AC5 
ab: 83 05 ac 9f 00 a0 04  addl $0x4,0xa0009fac  //Test AC5 
b2: 6a 01                 push $0x1 
b4: 68 ac 9f 00 a0        push $0xa0009fac  //Test AC7 
b9: 68 a8 9f 00 a0        push $0xa0009fa8  //Test AC7 
be: e8 fc ff ff ff        call bf <main+0xbf>  //Test AC7 
c3: c7 04 24 02 00 00 00  movl $0x2,(%esp,1)  //Test AC7 
ca: e8 fc ff ff ff        call cb <main+0xcb>  //Test AC7 
/* Test AC12 */ 
  79 
cf: e9 a8 9f 00 a0        jmp a000a07c <main+0xa000a07c> 
  80 
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